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Abstract: This article examines third-party liability issues of automated vehicles (AV) as 
currently regulated in Europe at the level of the European Union (EU) and at national level. 
The analysis of European law is preceded by a brief presentation of international law on traffic 
rules, whose binding effect has influenced the content of European provisions. Regarding 
national legislations, we examine the special rules of the German Road Traffic Act, which 
focuses on the liability of keeper and the driver, as well as the English Automated and Electric 
Vehicles Act 2018, which focuses on insurance and represents a different approach. We 
combine the analysis of the special rules with an overview of the applicable provisions on 
product liability and driver third-party liability in these countries. In addition, we briefly 
present the legal rules applicable in the US and compare them with the European ones. We 
conclude our article with some thoughts on eventual amendment of the existing rules de lege 
ferenda, aimed to inform the discussions globally on how to regulate civil liability arising from 
the use of AV.  
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Introduction: Technical parameters and automation levels of AV 
 
Automated vehicles (AV), commonly known as self-driving cars, are most probably the future 
of the car industry and driving. They are expected to dramatically decrease accidents and make 
roads safer, given that 94% of grave accidents are due to human error, while at the same time 
reduce significantly traffic congestion, driving costs and CO2 emissions.
2 
AV are the result of combining and integrating multiple sensors into a single system that help 
the vehicle “understand” the environment it is moving and adjust its road behaviour thereon3. 
They combine sensors and software to control, navigate, and drive the vehicle.4 Some of these 
sensors are already in use, e.g. satellite-navigation sensors and ultra-sonic sensors used to 
detect obstacles in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle. However, they are currently being 
used either isolated from each other or combined in low-level automation mode, just assisting 
the human driver, e.g. lane centring assist systems or adaptive cruise control systems. New 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Automated vehicles for safety, NHTSA, https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-
vehicles-safety (last visited on July 31, 2019) and Pete Goldin, 10 Advantages of Autonomous Vehicles (Feb. 20, 
2018) http://www.itsdigest.com/10-advantages-autonomous-vehicles (last visited July 31, 2019). 
3 See e.g. Christian Gilbertsen, Here’s how the sensors in autonomous cars work, THE DRIVE (Mar. 27, 2017) 
http://www.thedrive.com/tech/8657/heres-how-the-sensors-in-autonomous-cars-work (last visited July 31, 2019). 
4 Self-Driving Cars Explained https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/how-self-driving-cars-
work#.W2xOmSQzapo (last visited July 31, 2019). 
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sensors are also expected to be widely introduced, such as Lidar, which use light beams to 
exactly identify obstacles around the car. 
Thus, there are different levels of automation, which vary from merely assisting the human 
driver to driverless operation. SAE International, a global association of engineers and related 
technical experts in the aerospace, automotive and commercial-vehicle industries,5 has 
developed a widely recognised, six-class taxonomy of AV:6 
The human driver performs all or part of the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT)7 
Level 0 – No Automation: The human driver performs the entire DDT. 
 Level 1 – Driver Assistance: The driving automation system executes, in a sustained 
manner and as specified in the vehicle’s Operational Design Domain (ODD)8, either 
the lateral (steering) or the longitudinal (acceleration/deceleration) vehicle motion, 
while the driver performs the remainder of the DDT. 
 Level 2 – Partial Automation: The driving automation system executes, in a 
sustained and ODD-specific manner, both the lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion, 
while the driver completes the subtask of the Object and Event Detection Response9 
and supervises the driving automation system. 
The Automated Driving System (ADS)10, while engaged, performs the entire DDT  
 Level 3 – Conditional Automation: The ADS performs, in a sustained and ODD-
specific way, the entire DDT, while the human driver has the role of the fallback-
ready user, i.e. she is receptive to intervene and respond appropriately following 
ADS-issued requests or DDT performance-relevant system failures. 
                                                 
5 http://www.sae.org/about/ (last visited July 31, 2019). 
6 Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles, at 
19 (Jan. 16, 2014, latest revised June 15, 2018). See general info thereon 
https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_201806/ (last visited July 31, 2019). 
7 The Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) comprises all real-time operational and tactical functions required to operate 
a vehicle in on-road traffic, e.g. steering, acceleration/deceleration, monitoring the driving environment etc. 
Strategic functions, such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints, are not included in the 
DDT. See definition in SAE Standard J3016_201806, supra note 6, para.3.13. 
8 The Operational Design Domain (ODD) are the operating conditions under which a given driving automation 
system or feature thereof is specifically designed to function – see definition in SAE Standard J3016_201806, 
supra note 6, para.3.22. 
9 The Object and Event Detection Response (OEDR) is comprised by the subtasks of the Dynamic Driving Task 
(DDT) that include monitoring the driving environment (detecting, recognizing, and classifying objects and events 
and preparing to respond as needed) and responding appropriately to such objects and events, i.e., as needed to 
complete the DDT and/or DDT fallback - see definition in SAE Standard J3016_201806, supra note 6, para.3.20.  
The DDT fallback is the response by the user to either perform the DDT or achieve a minimal risk condition after 
a malfunction has occurred regarding the performance of the DDT or if the vehicle has exited Operational Design 
Domain (ODD), or the response by an Automated Driving System to achieve minimal risk condition, given the 
same circumstances - see definition in SAE Standard J3016_201806, supra note 6, para.3.14. 
10 Automated Driving System (ADS) means the hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing 
the entire DDT on a sustained basis, regardless of whether it is limited to a specific operational design domain 
(ODD); this term is used specifically to describe a level 3, 4, or 5 driving automation system - see definition in 
SAE Standard J3016_201806, supra note 6, para.3.2. 
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 Level 4 – High Automation:  The ADS performs, in a sustained and ODD-specific 
way, the entire DDT and DDT fallback. 
Level 5 – Full Automation: The ADS performs, in a sustained and unconditional way 
the entire DDT and DDT fallback. 
AV are complex systems comprised of sophisticated hardware and software components.11 
Moreover, highly AV are non-deterministic, in the sense that their behaviour depends on the 
input they receive from their sensors, which is combined with learning algorithms that enable 
modification of their current behavior. As a result, AV can act upon their environment without 
being fully controlled by a human being, while their actions and the potential consequences are 
not fully defined and predictable when they are taken into use.12 
The above-mentioned elements pose great legal challenges also from a liability perspective. 
Traditionally, the driver can fully control the vehicle while driving and this is also reflected in 
current liability rules on traffic accidents: liability rests with the driver and only exceptionally 
with the vehicle manufacturer. However, this situation is about to change with AV, in which 
control of the vehicle is passed from the driver to the vehicle system to the extent of the 
automation level employed. In this regard, it noteworthy that some manufacturers have already 
publicly stated that they will assume responsibility and the related liability for any accidents 
that may occur while their vehicles are operated in automated mode.13 
Thus, the question is what liability rules apply to AV and how such liability is apportioned 
between the vehicle’s driver and the manufacturer. The complex and non-deterministic nature 
of AV creates also challenges regarding the person (natural person or legal entity) to whom the 
behavior of the vehicle system should be attributed.14 Some of these issues have been 
highlighted by accidents involving vehicles operated in automated or semi-automated modes.15  
To answer these questions, we examine the applicable liability rules of the European Union 
(EU) law, German law and UK law.  Germany is the European frontrunner in enacting liability 
rules on AV, while the UK followed a different approach by regulating insurance issues. 
Afterwards, we evaluate the current liability regime in Europe and examine potential needs for 
                                                 
11 Martina Barbero et al., Study on emerging issues of data ownership,  interoperability, (re-)usability and  
access to  data, and liability, Final Report prepared for the European Commission by Deloitte et al., 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/study-emerging-issues-data-ownership-interoperability-re-
usability-and-access-data-and  (last visited July 31, 2019), 105 [hereinafter Study on emerging issues]. 
12 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 
13 See e.g. AUDI takes lead in automated driving, despite regulatory hurdles (Sep. 18, 2018) EURACTIV.COM, 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/automated-vehicles/news/audi-takes-lead-in-automated-driving-despite-
regulatory-hurdles/ (last visited July 31, 2019); Volvo CEO: Kirsten Korosec, We will accept all liability when 
our cars are in autonomous mode (Oct. 7, 2015), FORTUNE http://fortune.com/2015/10/07/volvo-liability-self-
driving-cars/ (last visited July 31, 2019).  
14 Study on emerging issues, supra note 11, 104. 
15 See e.g. Dana Hull and Ryan Beene, A Timeline of the Tesla Autopilot Crash Investigation (Apr. 13, 2018, 1:47 
AM GMT+3) BLOOMBERG,  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-12/a-timeline-of-the-tesla-
autopilot-crash-investigation (last visited July 31, 2019); Sam Levin and Julia Carrie Wong, Self-driving Uber 
kills Arizona woman in first fatal crash involving pedestrian  (Mar. 19, 2018, 22:48), THE GUARDIAN, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/19/uber-self-driving-car-kills-woman-arizona-tempe (last 
visited July 31, 2019). 
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amendment of the existing rules. Our overarching aim is to contribute to the discussions taking 
place globally on how to regulate civil liability arising from the use of AV.  
Our analysis will start with pertinent provisions of international law, because they affect the 
content of both EU and national laws. 
1. International law 
In international law, there are no uniform liability rules. However, there are harmonized 
technical and traffic rules, which could influence liability, especially in determining eventual 
negligence of the driver and the manufacturer.  
  
1.1 Technical rules 
International technical rules have been developed in the framework of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which was set up in 1947 by the UN Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC). ECE facilitates greater economic integration and cooperation 
among its member countries and promotes sustainable development, also through negotiation 
of international legal instruments. Although UNECE's major aim is to promote pan-European 
economic integration, it includes States from North America, including the USA, and Asia, 
while any UN Member State may participate thereto.16 The UNECE technical rules, also known 
as UN Regulations, regard the type approval of vehicles and contain technical requirements, 
according to which road vehicles may be permitted to traffic.17  
The legal basis of these rules is mainly the so called ‘1958 Agreement’,18 to which such 
technical requirements are annexed. The 1958 Agreement provides that State parties thereto 
mutually recognise the type approvals that are made according to the UNECE Regulations. 
New Regulations and amendments to Regulations in force are adopted by a majority of two 
thirds of the contracting parties present. For a State Party to avoid being bound by a new 
Regulation or an amendment, it has to notify disagreement within six months from its adoption; 
otherwise the Regulation becomes binding. However, if more than a third of the contracting 
parties object to the Regulation, it does not come into force. 
The technical rules are prepared by the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations 
(WP 29), which is a permanent working party in the institutional framework of the United 
Nations with a specific mandate and rules of procedure. It works as a global forum allowing 
open discussions on motor vehicle regulations.  
                                                 
16 https://www.unece.org/mission.html (last visited July 31, 2019). Currently ECE has 56 Member States, see 
http://www.unece.org/oes/nutshell/member_States_representatives.html (last visited July 31, 2019). 
17 https://www.unece.org/mission.html (last visited July 31, 2019). 
18 Agreement concerning the Adoption of Uniform Conditions of Approval and Reciprocal Recognition of Approval 
for Motor Vehicle Equipment and Parts, Mar. 20, 1958, 335 U.N.T.S. 211, which under the current third revision of 
Oct. 20, 2017, has the title “Agreement concerning the Adoption of Harmonized Technical United Nations 
Regulations for Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and Parts which can be Fitted and/or be Used on Wheeled Vehicles 
and the Conditions for Reciprocal Recognition of Approvals Granted on the Basis of these United Nations 
Regulations, C.N.314.2017.TREATIES-XI.B.16. 
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Current ECE rules do not provide for AV. Nonetheless, much work is ongoing and many ECE 
working groups are working on various parameters of AV, preparing rules and 
recommendations.19  
 
1.2 Harmonized traffic rules 
Harmonized traffic rules that were developed in the framework of UNECE can be found in the 
1949 Geneva Convention and its successor, the 1968 Vienna Convention. As a guardian to 
these conventions serves the UNECE ‘Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety (WP.1)’.20 
The 1949 Geneva Convention21 establishes uniform international traffic rules, to promote the 
development and safety of international road traffic. Art. 8(1) and (5) of the Convention 
provides that every vehicle must have a driver, who must be able to control it at all times.  
The 1968 Vienna Convention22 replaced the 1949 Geneva Convention. Many States, including 
the US, Canada and Ireland are only party to the latter.23 However, most EU-Member States 
are parties to the 1968 Vienna Convention.24 Just like its predecessor, Art. 8(1) and (5) of the 
1968 Vienna Convention provides that a driver should always control fully the vehicle and 
must be able to control it. 
Nonetheless, in 2016, the 1968 Vienna Convention was amended, to allow automated driving 
technologies that transfer driving tasks to the vehicle, provided that these technologies conform 
to the UNECE Regulations or can be overridden or switched off by the driver.25 However, a 
human driver is still required, while it is not clear if the driver may engage in parallel activities 
while the automated driving mode is engaged. 
Furthermore, the Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety (WP.1) has adopted a resolution on the 
deployment of highly and fully automated vehicles in road traffic.26 The objective of the 
resolution is, among others, to guide Contracting Parties on the safe deployment of AV in road 
traffic and to provide complementary recommendations supporting the road safety principles 
of the 1949 and 1968 Conventions on Road Traffic.27 Section 4 of the Resolution provides that 
AV should:  
                                                 
19 RELEVANT UNECE ACTIVITIES ON AUTOMATED DRIVING, http://www.unece.org/trans/themes/transtheme-
its/automated-vehicles/automated-driving.html (last visited July 31, 2019).  
20https://www.unece.org/trans/roadsafe/rsabout.html (last visited on July 31, 2019). 
21 Convention on Road Traffic, Sep. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
22 Convention on Road Traffic, Nov. 8, 1968, 1042 U.N.T.S. 17. 
23 See the signatories at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20XI/xi-b-
1.en.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2019). 
24 See the list of contracting parties at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20XI/XI-B-19.en.pdf (last visited Dec 2, 
2019). 
25 See Article 8 para. 5bis and Article 39 para. 1 of the amended Convention. 
26 Report of the Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety on its seventy-seventh session ECE/TRANS/WP.1/165, 
Annex 1, Oct. 3, 2018, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2018/wp1/ECE-TRANS-WP1-165e.pdf 
(last visited July 31, 2019) [hereinafter UNECE Resolution].  
27 UNECE Resolution Section 2. 
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(a) Make road safety a priority;  
(b) Monitor and safely interact with the surrounding traffic environment;  
(c) Endeavour to safely tolerate errors of the vehicles’ users, inside and outside of the 
vehicle, and of other road users in order to minimize potential effects of such errors;  
(d) Comply with traffic rules,  
(e) Only operate within their Operational Driving Domain; 
(f) Be capable of achieving a state that maximizes road safety when a given trip cannot or 
should not be completed;  
(g) React to unforeseen situations in a way that minimizes danger to the vehicle’s users 
and other road users;  
(h) Communicate with their users and other road users, in a clear, effective and consistent 
way, by providing sufficient information about their status and intention, and enabling an 
appropriate interaction;  
(j) Operate in a way that enables verification as to whether or not they are or were 
performing dynamic control; and  
(k) Enable their deactivation in a safe manner. 
The resolution contains also recommendations to users of AV, such as to be aware of the proper 
use of the AV before starting a journey, meet the requirements and procedures for safe use, 
etc.28 In addition, the resolution contains recommendations to governments, e.g. to raise public 
awareness and adopt policies on data safety and cyber security.29 The recommendations of the 
resolution are not legally binding; however, they provide useful guidance on the standard of 
care expected by manufacturers and users.  
 
2. EU law 
In EU law there are rules on product liability and safety. These rules have the form of 
Directives. According to Art. 288(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, “a Directive 
shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods”. This 
means that each EU Member State undertakes to incorporate the provisions of the Directive 
into its national legal system through national harmonizing legislation. 
2.1 No special rules on AV 
At EU level, there are no harmonized liability provisions on AV. At present, the European 
Commission focuses on issues of interconnectivity and interoperability between vehicles 
themselves, and between vehicles and road infrastructure.30 
                                                 
28 Id., Section 5. 
29 Id., Section 6. 
30 See European Commission, A European strategy on Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems, a milestone 
towards cooperative, connected and automated mobility COM(2016) 766 final (Nov. 30, 2016). 
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2.2 Product liability– Directive 85/374/EEC 
Product liability in the EU is regulated by Directive 85/374/EEC31 (Product Liability Directive 
- PLD). The PLD contains generic rules, which apply also to AV. The Directive’s provisions 
on the liability of the producer are of mandatory nature and cannot be derogated by contractual 
clauses (Art. 12). 
2.2.1 Objective and level of harmonization 
The PLD aims at a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological 
production32. As a result, it is a full harmonization Directive, which means that EU Member 
States (MS) are not allowed to lay down, in their harmonization legislation, more stringent 
rules to protect victims. 
However, Art. 13 PLD clarifies that the Directive does not affect contractual or non-contractual 
liability or special product-liability regimes that were in force at the date when the PLD was 
notified (7 August 1985). In that case, these rules remain unaffected and can form a separate 
legal base for compensation claims (Art. 13).33 Nonetheless, MS may not establish or maintain 
a general product-liability regime that deviates from the PLD provisions.34 
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), former European Court of Justice (ECJ), has underlined 
that the PLD seeks to achieve, in the matters regulated by it, complete harmonization of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States; however, as can be seen 
from its eighteenth recital, the PLD seeks to harmonize exhaustively only the liability aspects 
for defective products regulated by it.35 
For AV, the Directive’s full harmonization character entails that any regulatory shortcomings 
in the system of product liability of the EU Member States cannot be overcome by laying down 
new pieces of national legislation. New rules could be established only if the EU amends or 
repeals the Directive. An alternative possibility might be that national courts adopt the 
interpretation of the existing national tort rules on product liability. 
 
                                                 
31 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 1985 O.J. (L 210), 29 – 33 [hereinafter 
PLD]. According to the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning  of the  European Union, Art. 288  
para. 3, May 9, 2009,  2008  O.J. (C  115)  47 [hereinafter TFEU] “a Directive shall be binding, as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods”. This means that each EU Member State undertakes to incorporate the provisions of the 
Directive through national harmonizing legislation. 
32 PLD Recitals (2) and (7). 
33 See CJEU Case C-402/03 Skov Æg v Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v J. Mikkelsen 
and M.D. Nielsen Judgment of 10 Jan. 2006, 2006 EC.R. I-199, which held that the PLD precludes a national rule 
under which the supplier is answerable, beyond the cases listed exhaustively in Article 3 para. 3 thereof, for the 
no-fault liability which the PLD establishes and imposes on the producer; yet it does not preclude a national rule 
under which the supplier is answerable without restriction for the producer’s fault-based liability. 
34 ECJ Case C-183/00, González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 EC.R.. I-03901, paras 32-33. 
35 CJEU Case C-621/15, N. W and Others v Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC and Others, http://curia.europa.eu, paras 
20-21; CJEU Case C-310/13, Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH v S, http://curia.europa.eu, paras. 23-24;. 
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2.2.2 Elements of liability 
The Directive imposes strict liability on the ‘producer’ for ‘damages’ caused by a ‘defect’ in 
its ‘product’ (Art. 1).  
 
2.2.2.1 ‘Product’ 
A ‘product’ under the Directive is any movable, even though incorporated into another 
movable or into an immovable (Art. 2, first sentence). ‘Product’ includes electricity (Art. 2, 
third sentence). 
 
2.2.2.1.1 Software as a ‘product’ 
It is disputed whether the PLD covers software. As long as software is embedded in movables, 
software can be seen as a ‘product’.36 For non-embedded software, the prevailing view in many 
MS37 considers it a ‘product’: on the one hand, there is no distinction in the PLD between 
material substance and information; on the other hand, the objective of the PLD to protect end 
users would be undermined if the claimant had to prove that the damage came from a hardware 
defect and not from a software defect, because the damaging effect is the same for claimants 
in both cases.38  
An extensive interpretation of ‘product’ to cover software could be supported by the fact that 
electricity, which is also intangible, is a ‘product’. Besides, at the time of the drafting and 
negotiation of the Directive such technological advances could hardly have been foreseen. 
Therefore, it can be argued that an evolutive, wide interpretation of ‘product’ is necessary, to 
align the PLD with modern needs. However, the counter-argument is that we need to maintain 
legal certainty and not disturb the balance of interests stricken by the PLD. 
The issue is unclear and is being currently debated in the framework of the Directive’s 
evaluation and possible amendment.39  
If software is not covered by the PLD, then the PLD does not preclude national legislation, 
which would extend product liability rules to software.40 
                                                 
36 Study on emerging issues (supra note 11), 119; Peter Rott, Rechtspolitischer Handlungsbedarf im 
Haftungsrecht, insbesondere für digitale Anwendungen, May 4, 2018, at 15, 
https://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/downloads/2018/05/04/gutachten_handlungsbedarf_im_haftungsrecht.pd
f (last visited  July 31, 2019).  
37 Rott (supra note 36), 16. See also K. Alheit, The applicability of the EU Product Liability Directive to software, 
34 THE COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, 188, 194-195 (2001), with 
further citations. 
38 Rott (supra note 36), 16. 
39 See European Commission, Evaluation of the Directive 85/374/EEC concerning liability for defective products 
– Roadmap, Sep. 27, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/18842/ (last visited 31 July 2019). 
40 Rott (supra note 36), 19. 
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2.2.2.1.2 Consequences for AV 
AV as such are tangible movables and are undoubtedly ‘products’. However, the situation 
regarding software used in AV is less certain. Such uncertainty in enhanced in cases of software 
updates and functionality revisions, especially when these are conducted by third parties.41 To 
the extent that software updates can be seen as a service, they will not be covered by the PLD, 
which regulates only ‘products’.42  
We subscribe to the view that the PLD covers software necessary for the vehicle operation, e.g. 
navigation, steering and breaking software, including software updates.43 However, other types 
of software, such as entertainment software provided by third parties are not necessarily 
covered. In any case, to enhance legal certainty, an explicit clarification in the PLD through an 
amendment is recommended.44 
 
2.2.2.2 Persons liable 
Art. 3(1) PLD clarifies that liable ‘producers’ are the manufacturer of the end product, the 
component manufacturer, the producer of any raw material, as well as any person who, by 
putting his/her name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the product presents himself 
as its producer. Furthermore, the importer of the product in the EU is also deemed a ‘producer’ 
[Art. 3(2)].  
Where the producer of the product cannot be identified, each supplier of the product is treated 
as its producer, unless he/she informs the injured person, within a reasonable time, of the 
identity of the producer or of the person who supplied him/her with the product. The same 
applies, in the case of an imported product, if this product does not indicate the identity of the 
importer referred to in Art. 3(2), even if the name of the producer is indicated [Art. 3(3)]. The 
supplier, against whom proceedings are brought by an injured person, has to inform the latter, 
on his/her own initiative and promptly, of the identity of the producer or his/her own supplier 
– a mere denial of the supplier that he/she is not the producer is insufficient.45  
All these persons are liable jointly and severally, without prejudice to the provisions of national 
law concerning the rights of contribution or recourse (Art. 5). The objective of these provisions 
is to enhance consumer protection by increasing the number of the potentially liable persons.46 
                                                 
41 Study on emerging issues (supra note 11), 122. 
42 Id. 
43 Rott (supra note 36), 18. 
44 See also Rott (supra note 36), 18; Study on emerging issues (supra note 11), 113. 
45 ECJ Judgment of 2 Dec. 2009, case C-358/08 Aventis Pasteur, ECLI:EU:C:2009:744, paras 57-58. 
46 PLD Recitals (4) and (5). 
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The CJEU has clarified that the PLD regulates only the liability of producers for defective 
products and does not cover the liability of service providers who use defective products.47  
Regarding AV, the manufacturers of the vehicles as well as their importers into the EU will be 
liable. Such liability will include malfunctions of embedded software.48 Furthermore, the 
manufacturer of such software will also be liable, especially regarding safety critical software, 
such as navigation, steering and breaking software.49 Liability of suppliers of AV under the 
PLD will have limited importance in practice, since in the car industry the identity of the end-
product manufacturer or the importer is known.  
In addition, the above-mentioned judgment of the CJEU on non-liability of service providers 
under the PLD 50 makes clear that persons who provide services using AV, e.g. taxi services or 
ride-hailing services, will not be liable.  
It has been suggested that the PLD contains a limited list of liable persons, which undermines 
the protection of victims of AVs, since parties like rental companies and other service 
providers, pure developers of the operating technology and testing companies are not covered 
by the PLD.51 Nevertheless, it has to be considered that the PLD is the result of balance of 
interests, as its preamble clearly indicates, and does not aim to offer complete protection in all 
cases. National (negligence) legal regimes that operate side-by-side with the PLD could offer 
additional protection.     
 
2.2.2.3 ‘Defect’ 
2.2.2.3.1 Safety expectations 
According to Art. 6(1) PLD, a product is ‘defective’, when it does not provide the safety which 
a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including (a) the 
presentation of the product, (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product 
would be put, (c) the time when the product was put into circulation. Art. 6(2) PLD clarifies 
that a product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is 
subsequently put into circulation. The CJEU has ruled that a product is put into circulation 
when it is taken out of the manufacturing process operated by the producer and enters a 
marketing process in the form in which it is offered to the public in order to be used or 
                                                 
47 CJEU Case C-495/10, Centre hospitalier universitaire de Besançon v Thomas Dutrueux and Caisse primaire 
d'assurance maladie du Jura, 2011 E.C.R. I-14155. 
48 Rott (supra note 36), p. 21. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See supra note 47. 
51 Kyriaki Noussia, Autonomous vehicles: Legal considerations and dilemmas, in INSURTECH: A LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY VIEW 253, 259 (Pierpaolo Marano and Kyriaki Noussia eds., 2019)   
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consumed.52 The time that the product was put into circulation is critical, since ‘producers’ are 
only liable for defects that existed at that time.53 
Hence, the PLD covers design defects (i.e. a whole production is defective) and manufacturing 
defects (i.e. isolated products of a production series are defective). It also establishes a duty to 
warn on dangers of the product, albeit to a limited extent, i.e. until the product has been put 
into circulation. However, the PLD lays down no duty to warn on dangers after the product has 
been put into circulation or to recall defective products. These duties are foreseen in separate 
pieces of European legislation on product safety, which do not impose EU-wide liability 
rules.54 
Recital (6) of the PLD preamble makes clear that, to protect the physical well-being and 
property of the consumer, the defectiveness of the product should be determined by reference 
to the lack of the safety which the public at large is entitled to expect and not to its fitness for 
use. Therefore, the safety-expectations test is judged objectively rather than by reference to the 
expectations of the specific user.55 In addition, the PLD establishes a duty to put into circulation 
products that are reasonably safe, taking into account all circumstances – not products that are 
absolutely safe.56 In this regard, some national courts have referred to a risk-benefit analysis of 
the product’s characteristics, taking into account the kind and the extent of the risks connected 
to the use of the product, the possibility that such risks materialize, the cost of additional safety 
measures and the benefits from the use of the product.57  
At the same time, safety is assessed by excluding any misuse of the product not reasonable 
under the circumstances.58 Consequently, the reasonable safety expectations of the user 
encompass cases of foreseeable product misuse. Producers must consider foreseeable product 
misuse both when designing the product and when issuing instructions and warnings.59 
Moreover, the CJEU has ruled that, where it is found that products belonging to the same group 
or forming part of the same production series, such as pacemakers and implantable cardioverter 
                                                 
52 CJEU Case C-127/04 Declan O'Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd and Sanofi Pasteur SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-01313. 
53 PLD Art. 7(b), which precludes the producer’s liability for defects that did not exist at the time the product was 
put into circulation. 
54 See Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general 
product safety, Art. 5, 2002 O.J. (L 11); Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
5 September 2007 establishing a framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, 
components and separate technical units intended for such vehicles, Art. 32, 2007 O.J. (L 263) 1. 
55 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 16, 2009 (Airbag), NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2952 (para. 12), 2009 (Ger.). 
56 RACHEL MULHERON, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW, Defective Products – Online Content, 196 (2016) 
https://www.cambridge.org/files/6614/7610/6091/Defective_products_Mulheron.pdf (last visited July 22, 2019).  
57 Wilkes v DePuy International Limited [2016] EWHC 3096, paras 65-67 (Eng.), which nonetheless rejects the 
risk-utility test as applied in the US; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 16, 2009 
(Airbag), NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2952 (paras. 16-18), 2009 (Ger.). 
58 PLD Recital (6). 
59 Martin Ebers, Autonomes Fahren: Produkt und Produzentenhaftung, in: AUTONOMES FAHREN 93, 112-113 
(Bernd H. Oppermann and Jutta Stender Vorwachs eds., 2017); Rott, supra note 36, 24. 
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defibrillators, have a potential defect, such a product may be classified as defective without 
there being any need to establish that that product has such a defect.60 
2.2.2.3.2 Safety expectations of AV users 
The ‘reasonable’ expectations of users of AV may not always be easy to define. Since the main 
promise of AV technology is enhanced safety, users are entitled to expect that AV will be safer 
than ordinary cars.61 It has been suggested that AV should be able to deal autonomously with 
all situations that could occur during the autonomous phase of driving.62 They should also be 
in position to recognize wrongful behavior of other road users and adjust their own behavior to 
prevent an accident.63 
According to a mixed criterion, the AV safety should be compared, at first stage and as a 
minimum, to that of a  reasonable  driver.  At a second stage, there should be a comparison  
between the accident rate of conventional vehicles and the accident rate of a particular fleet of 
AVs.64 
Moreover, as producers gain more experience and technology progresses, the reasonable safety 
expectations of the users will increase. After a certain period, a system may not correspond to 
such safety expectations, although the failure rate is lower than that of humans.65  
In any case, the thorough examination of the circumstances of each case is necessary. 
Advertising statements combined with instructions and warnings in user manuals are expected 
to play a crucial role. 
In advertising, producers should be careful not to raise exaggerated expectations by using terms 
such as ‘autonomous’ or ‘auto pilot’, which could be misunderstood and lead to product 
misuse.66 In the case of semi-autonomous vehicles, producers should take into account that 
                                                 
60 CJEU Joined Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13, Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v AOK Sachsen-Anhalt 
– Die Gesundheitskasse and Betriebskrankenkasse RWE, http://curia.europa.eu. 
61 Ebers, supra note 59, 108. 
62 Id., 104. 
63 Id., 105. 
64 Patti, Francesco Paolo Patti, The European Road to Autonomous Vehicles, 43 Fordham Int'l 
L.J. 125, 161 (2019).  
65 Ib. 
66 Id., 112. Compare the use of the term ‘auto pilot’ in Tesla’s semi-automated vehicles. In Germany, the 
Federal Motor Transport Authority found such terms misleading and asked Tesla to stop using them – see 
Germany says Tesla should not use 'Autopilot' in advertising, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2016, 4:30 PM), 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-tesla-germany-idUKKBN12G0KQ (last visited July 31, 2019). More recently, 
in the US, two consumer advocacy groups have requested the Federal Trade Commission to investigate Tesla’s 
advertising practices consisting in the use of terms such as ‘auto pilot’ and ‘full self-driving hardware’ in Level 
2 vehicles – see Jason Torchinsky, Consumer Group Says Tesla's Autopilot Is 'Deceptive,' Calls For 
Investigation, JALOPNIK (May 23, 2018, 12:07 PM),  https://jalopnik.com/consumer-group-says-teslas-autopilot-
is-deceptive-call-1826249830 (last visited July 31, 2019). 
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drivers may use the vehicles in ways they were not meant to be used, e.g. by relying too much 
on the driver-assistance systems.67 
As to instructions and warnings, producers of AV should take all effort to ensure that the user 
can operate the vehicle safely. Therefore, they have to inform the user on: (i) the exact purposes 
for which the AV is meant to be used, (ii) how should the system be configured and operated, 
(iii) the extent to which the system needs to be monitored during operation, (iv) how should 
the user react in case of system failure and (v) how should the system be regularly maintained.68 
Besides, foreseeable misuse could also be the attempt of third parties to unlawfully gain control 
of the AV. Therefore, security shortcomings of software, which could enable unlawful 
interference with the operation of the vehicle and result in damage, may too be considered as 
‘defect’. 
Human factors in the human-machine interface of AV, such as warning signals and time 
required for the driver to take over manual control of the vehicle will also be considered in 
determining the legitimate safety expectations.69 
In addition, given the judgment of the CJEU in the Boston Scientific Medizintechnik case,70 it 
is not unlikely that AV of a specific type are found defective because of defects discovered 
only to some of the vehicles of that type. Nonetheless, caution is required: the above-mentioned 
case concerned a very specific category of products and a safety problem in a particular AV 
may not imply the defectiveness of the entire fleet of such AV.71 
2.2.2.3.3 Time in which AV were ‘put into circulation’ 
As mentioned above, an important factor in determining defectiveness is the time in which the 
product was put into circulation.72 
In view of the self-learning abilities of AV, an important challenge will be to determine if the 
AV was ‘defective’ when it was put into circulation. It could be argued that safety issues 
created by learned behavior fall outside the scope of the PLD, unless one considers as a ‘defect’ 
the learning algorithms of the AV, especially if they do not provide adequate safeguards against 
potentially harmful behavior.73  
In such cases, the reasonable user expectations are that the producer will take care to prevent 
the vehicle system from learning any dangerous behavior. As mentioned before, failure of the 
producer to consider cases of foreseeable product misuse may constitute a ‘defect’. In self-
                                                 
67 Ebers, supra note 59, 112. 
68 Id., 111. 
69 See on human factors infra 7.6. 
70Supra note 60.  
71 Patti, supra note 64,149.    
72 See supra under 2.2.2.3.1. 
73 See Study on emerging issues, supra note 11, 121. 
17 
 
learning systems this means that the producer should avoid that the system learns behaviors 
that contradict its safety purpose.74 
2.2.3 ‘Damage’ 
‘Damage’ is defined in Art. 9 PLD. It includes personal damages, yet property damage is 
covered only under certain requirements: no damage to the defective product itself is covered, 
while damage to other property items requires that (a) the damage exceeds 500€, (b) the 
damaged item is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, and (c) the item 
was used by the injured person mainly for his/her own private use or consumption. Non-
material damage can be awarded according to the applicable national provisions.  
Thus, pure economic loss, contrary to consequential loss, is not covered by the PLD. 
Recoverable damages under PLD is restricted by the full harmonization character of the PLD.75 
As to the notion of ‘other property items’, it would cover cases of software subsequently 
installed.76Moreover, Art. 16(1) PLD allows EU Member States (MS) to introduce an upper 
limit of the producer’s liability, which cannot be lower than € 70 million, for damage resulting 
from death or personal injury and caused by identical items with the same defect. This provision 
applies mainly to cases of design defects. Germany, Spain and Portugal have used such 
possibility.77 Nonetheless, at least in Germany, the upper limit has been criticized as not serving 
any purpose, given that (i) the limit has not been used in any case so far, (ii) claimants could 
base their claims on tort, which has no upper limit, and (c) that the non-existence of such limit 
in other MS has not created any problems.78  
Damage to other items must exceed 500 €. This threshold aims at avoiding litigation in an 
excessive number of cases79 and encourage out-of-court dispute settlement for small claims.80 
The minimum limit has been implemented differently by MS. Some MS, including Germany, 
interpret such limit as deductible from the compensation due; other MS, such as the UK and 
the Netherlands, see it as a liability threshold, which once overpassed, enables the claimant to 
receive full compensation.81 This provision has been criticized, because, among others, it does 
not discourage litigation in MS that have in place a parallel, tort-based system of product 
liability.82 
                                                 
74 Rott, supra note 36, 34. 
75 Id., 40. 
76 Id., 41. 
77 See Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective Products, 
COM(2000) 893 final (Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Report 2001]. 
78 Rott, supra note 36, 43. 
79 PLD Recital (9). 
80 Commission Report 2001 (supra note 77), at 19. 
81 European Commission, Third report on the application of Council Directive on the approximation of laws,  
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, COM 
(2006) 496 final (Sep. 14, 2006), 11. See also Rott, supra note 36, 42. 
82 Rott, supra note 36, 45. 
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Moreover, the PLD makes clear that damage to other property items is recoverable, only if 
these items are intended and mainly used for private purposes. Thus, the PLD will not cover 
damage caused by an AV to a vehicle used for professional purposes or to a building with 
offices.  
2.2.4 Defences 
Art. 7 PLD lays down the reasons of exoneration of the producer from its liability. These 
circumstances must be interpreted strictly.83 The producer is not liable if he/she can prove 
one of following defences:  
(a) That the producer did not put the product into circulation. This is intended primarily 
to cover cases in which a person other than the producer has caused the product to 
leave the process of manufacture.84 
(b) That, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect which caused 
the damage did not exist at the time when the product was put into circulation by the 
producer or that this defect came into being afterwards. 
(c) That the producer neither manufactured the product for sale or any form of 
distribution for economic purpose, nor did it manufacture or distribute the product in 
the course of its business.  
(d) That the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations 
issued by the public authorities.  
(e) That the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the producer 
put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect 
to be discovered (state-of-the-art defence). The ECJ has clarified85 that Article 7(e) 
is not specifically directed at the practices and safety standards in use in the industrial 
sector in which the producer is operating. It does refer to the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge, including the most advanced level of such knowledge, at the 
time when the product in question was put into circulation. Second, this defence is 
judged objectively, considering the state of knowledge of which the producer is 
presumed to have been informed. Nevertheless, it is implicit in the wording of Article 
7(e) that the relevant scientific and technical knowledge must have been accessible 
at the time when the product in question was put into circulation. Therefore, in order 
to have a defence under Article 7(e) PLD, the producer of a defective product must 
prove either that the objective state of scientific and technical knowledge, including 
the most advanced level of such knowledge at the time when the product in question 
was put into circulation, did not enable the discovery of the defect; or that such 
knowledge was not accessible at the time when the product in question was put into 
circulation.  
                                                 
83 ECJ case C-203/09, Volvo Car Germany GmbH v Autohof Weidensdorf GmbH, 2010 E.C.R. I-10721 
 para. 15. 
84 ECJ, ibid, para. 16. 
85 ECJ case C-300/95, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, 1997 E.C.R. I-2649, paras 26-29. 
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It is noteworthy that MS may opt to not make available to manufacturers such 
defence.86 So far, five MS have used such possibility, albeit only two MS do not 
allow such defence in all sectors.87 Nonetheless, it has been reported that the state-
of-the-art defence has had limited practical importance in Europe.88 
(f) Producers of components can be exonerated, if they prove that the defect is 
attributable to the design of the product in which the component has been fitted or to 
the instructions given by the manufacturer of the product.  
Moreover, the comparative or contributory negligence of the injured persons and their agents 
is taken into account [Art. 8(2)]. If the damage is due both to a defect in a product and to an act 
or omission of a third party, the producer and the third party will be held jointly liable [Art. 
8(1)].  
In the context of AV, which are technological advanced products, the state-of-the-art defence 
[Art. 7(e)] is expected to play a key role, despite the very high requirements for its 
establishment. This will have special importance in the case of learning algorithms, which 
might prove to be inadequate and lead to avoidable accidents. A cost-benefit analysis should 
be undertaken in which various factors are taken into account, such as the seriousness and the 
probability of risks, the expected benefits from the use of the product, the cost and feasibility 
of constructing a safer product; however, regarding personal injuries the risks have to be 
minimal.89  
In addition, if certain types of AV are used only for testing and experiments, producers can 
invoke the defence of Art. 7(c), i.e. that they did not manufacture the product for sale or any 
form of distribution for economic purpose.  
The comparative or contributory negligence of the user will be determined considering the 
user’s duties regarding the selection, monitoring and operation of the AV. It has been suggested 
that the user should: select an AV suitable for the intended use, e.g. take into account eventual 
restrictions of use in specific roads only; configure the AV according to the manufacturer 
instructions and respect all safety precautions; monitor the system operation and maintain it 
according to the user manual.90 
                                                 
86 PLD Art. 15 para. (1)(b). 
87 Luxembourg and Finland. Hungary and Spain do not provide for the defense only in the pharmaceuticals 
sector, while France excludes it regarding products of the human body – see Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Application of the 
Council Directive on the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC), COM(2018) 246 final (May 7, 2018), 4 
[hereinafter Commission Report 2018].   
88 Rott, supra note 36, 35. 
89 Ebers, supra note 59, 110; Janine Wendt and Marcel Oberländer, Produkt- und Produzentenhaftung bei 
selbstständig veränderlichen Systemen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INNOVATIONS- UNDTECHNIKRECHT [InTer] 58, 60 
(2016). 
90 Ebers, supra note 59, 115. 
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Concurrent causes of an accident, such as a defective collision avoidance system combined 
with failure of the driver to monitor adequately system performance, are very likely to create 
joint and several liability towards third parties.  
2.2.5 Burden of proof  
The injured person is required to prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship 
between defect and damage (Art. 4).  
According to the CJEU, under the principle of procedural autonomy and subject to the 
principles of equivalency and effectiveness, evidentiary issues are governed by the national 
law of each MS. The CJEU underlines the principle of effectiveness, which requires that 
national procedural rules do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the 
exercise of rights conferred by EU law. Yet, such rules must not undermine the apportionment 
of the burden of proof established in the PLD. Thus, circumstantial evidence may be allowed 
in certain cases, to establish such relationship, and alleviate the plaintiff’s burden of proof. 
However, this is allowed only on a case-by-case basis and provided that the burden of proof is 
not practically reversed. It would be a violation of the Directive’s rules, if a presumption of a 
causal link could be automatically created when specific facts, pre-identified by the legislature 
or a judicial body, are proven.91 
The provisions of the PLD on the burden of proof have received criticism as imposing an 
extreme burden of proof on claimants, especially in cases of complex products.92  The 
European Commission has characterised the burden of proof of the causal link between the 
defect and the claimant’s damage as “the single most difficult stepping stone to receiving 
compensation”.93 However, such difficulties have been mitigated mainly by the practice of 
courts in many MS by granting evidentiary facilitations under specific circumstances.94  
The use of circumstantial evidence is important in cases of AV, which are complex, 
technologically advanced products. National courts in the EU may provide evidentiary 
facilitations to plaintiffs, such as proof based on the balance of probabilities instead of full 
proof; but such facilitation is not allowed to result in changing the allocation of the evidentiary 
burden foreseen in the PLD. 
 
2.2.6 Time limits  
Concerning time bars, the PLD establishes a limitation period of three years from the day on 
which the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the damage, 
                                                 
91 See in detail CJEU case C-612/15, Criminal proceedings against Nikolay Kolev and Others, 
https://curia.europa.eu,  paras 26 et seq. 
92 Noussia, supra note 51, 259. 
93 Commission Report 2018, supra note, 5. 
94 See Commission Report 2001, supra note 77, 14-15. 
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the defect and the identity of the producer [Art. 10(1)]. In any case, the producer’s liability is 
extinguished upon the expiry of a period of 10 years from the date on which the producer put 
into circulation the actual product which caused the damage, unless the injured person has in 
the meantime instituted proceedings against the producer (Art. 11).  
The 10-year period is mainly justified by the fact that strict liability puts a higher burden on 
producers than fault-based liability; therefore, the liability period is limited in order not to 
discourage technological innovation and to allow insurance cover.95 Nevertheless, it has been 
criticized as too short for some categories of products,96 to which AV could be added. In the 
long-run, the 10-year limitation period entails that manufacturers will not be liable for defects 
of older vehicle models.  
 
2.2.7 Product liability insurance 
The European Commission has examined the possibility of introducing mandatory product- 
liability insurance, but has not found any compelling reasons to do so, since such insurance is 
widely available in the market and no practical problems have been reported.97 However, in 
some MS, e.g. France, there is such duty. Moreover, it has been submitted that a duty to obtain 
product liability insurance should be imposed, to ensure victim compensation in the event of 
the insolvency of the producer and in view of the wide availability and use of such insurance 
in the insurance market.98 
2.3 Recent legislative developments 
According to the latest evaluation of the PLD conducted by the European Commission (EC), 
the PLD continues to be a useful tool and to serve its purpose.99 Nevertheless, the EC believes 
that clarifications are needed regarding certain concepts, such as ‘product’, ‘producer’, ‘defect’, 
‘damage’ and the burden of proof.100  
At the same time, following a series of generic policy documents of EU institutions on new 
technologies and artificial intelligence,101 the EC drafted a Staff Working Document (SWD) 
on liability for emerging digital technologies, to identify legal challenges that new 
technologies, including autonomous vehicles, pose to the existing European and EU Member 
                                                 
95 Id., at 20. 
96 Rott, supra note 36, 46. 
97 Commission Report 2001, supra note 77, 21. 
98 Rott, supra note 36, 47-48. 
99 Commission Report 2018, supra note 87, 6. 
100 Id., at 8-9. 
101 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Mid-Term Review on the implementation of the 
Digital Single Market Strategy A Connected Digital Single Market for All, COM(2017) 228 final (May 5, 2017); 
European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law 
Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL), 2018 O.J. (C 252) 239. 
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States legislation due to their novel technical and operational characteristics.102 The EC is going 
to set up an Expert Group on ‘Liability and new Technologies’, which will work in two 
formations: the ‘Product Liability Directive’ formation and the ‘New Technologies’ formation. 
The ‘first formation, will discuss issues mainly on an update of the concepts of ‘producer’, 
‘product’ and ‘defect’, the development risk defense and the 500€ damage threshold, while the 
latter will analyze other relevant issues, such as the overall liability regimes.103 
2.4 Product safety 
The rules on product safety may also play a role in the potential liability of the manufacturer. 
These rules lay down safety requirements, combined with technical standards and procedures, 
which aim at ensuring the safety of the consumer products sold in the EU. Although these rules 
do not regulate directly product liability, they are often seen as rules protecting consumer 
interests and may create actionable rights against manufacturers, according to national tort rules 
on breach of statutory duty. 
2.4.1 General Product Safety Directive 
The general rules on product safety are contained in Directive 2001/95/EC, known as General 
Product Safety Directive (GPSD).104 The GPSD applies complementarily to sector-specific EU 
legislation [Art. 1(2)].  
A product is ‘safe’ when, under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use including 
duration and, where applicable, putting into service, installation and maintenance requirements, 
does not present any risk or only the minimum risks compatible with the product's use, 
considered to be acceptable and consistent with a high level of protection for the safety and 
health of persons, taking all circumstances into account [Art. 2(b)]. Furthermore, a product is 
deemed safe, when, in the absence of specific EU-law provisions, it conforms to the specific 
rules of national law of the Member State in whose territory the product is marketed [Art. 3(2)], 
as well as when it conforms to voluntary national standards transposing European standards 
[Art. 3(3)]. 
The GPSD obliges manufacturers to warn users on possible risks related to the use of the 
product, throughout the normal or reasonably foreseeable period of its use, where such risks 
are not immediately obvious without adequate warnings [Art. 5(1)]. Distributors are also 
required to act with due care in this regard and, if necessary, withdraw the product from the 
market or recall it from consumers [Art.5(2)]. Where the producers or distributors know or 
ought to know possible risks related to the use of the product, they must inform the competent 
authorities of the MS and cooperate with them on the appropriate actions [Art. 5(3)-(4)].  
 
                                                 
102 European Commission Staff Working Document on liability for emerging digital technologies, SWD (2018) 
137 final (Apr. 25, 2018). 
103 Id, at 17-21. 
104 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general product 
safety, Official Journal L 11, 15 Jan. 2002, pp. 4–17. 
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2.4.2 Safety of motor vehicles and components 
Directive 2007/46/EC105 establishes EU-wide harmonized rules for type approval of motor 
vehicles and their components. These rules regard the administrative procedure and technical 
requirements, the latter being annexed to the Directive.106 Furthermore, Regulation (EC) No 
78/2009107 lays down special type-approval rules of motor vehicles regarding pedestrians and 
other vulnerable road users, such as cyclists. 
It is noteworthy that type approval of a vehicle does not release the manufacturer from its 
liability, because they are the minimum technical requirements and higher safety standard are 
usually expected in particular cases.108 
 
2.5 Motor Insurance 
Directive 2009/103/EC (Motor Insurance Directive - MID)109 consolidates and codifies five 
pre-existing Directives on motor insurance, the first of which dates back to 1972.110 However, 
their content remains largely the same, which means that the case law of the (former) European 
Court of Justice on the interpretation of their provisions remains valid.111 
2.5.1 Objective 
The MID has a dual objective: on the one hand to ensure the free movement of vehicles 
normally based on EU territory and of persons travelling in those vehicles; on the other hand, 
to guarantee that the victims of accidents caused by those vehicles receive comparable 
treatment irrespective of where in the European Union the accident occurred.112 It is a minimum 
harmonization Directive, which means that MS may lay down measures more protective for 
victims than these provided for by the MID.113  
It should be underlined that the MID does not seek to harmonize national laws on traffic 
liability. EU MS remain free to determine conditions and type of such liability (strict or fault 
                                                 
105 Directive 2007/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 establishing a 
framework for the approval of motor vehicles and their trailers, and of systems, components and separate technical 
units intended for such vehicles, 2007 O.J. (L 263) 1. 
106 E.g. Electronic Stability Control (ESC), daylight running lights, seat belt requirements, maximum CO2 
emissions allowed etc. 
107 Regulation (EC) No 78/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 January 2009 on the type-
approval of motor vehicles with regard to the protection of pedestrians and other vulnerable road users, amending 
Directive 2007/46/EC and repealing Directives 2003/102/EC and 2005/66/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 35) 1. 
108 See e.g. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 7, 1986 (Verzinkungsspray),  
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT, 102 (para. 15), 1987 (Ger.). 
109 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to 
insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to 
insure against such liability, 2009 O.J. (L 263), 11 [hereinafter MID]. 
110 See MID recital (1). 
111 CJEU case C-334/16, José Luís Núñez Torreiro v AIG Europe Limited, Sucursal en España and Unión 
Española de Entidades Aseguradoras y Reaseguradoras, https://curia.europa.eu, para. 25. 
112 CJEU case C-162/13 Damijan Vnuk v Zavarovalnica Triglav d.d., https://curia.europa.eu, para. 50. 
113 Art. 28 para. 1 MID. 
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based).114 However, the CJEU has underlined that MS must exercise their powers in 
compliance with EU law, whose aim, in this instance, is to ensure that compulsory motor 
vehicle insurance allows all passengers who are victims of an accident caused by a motor 
vehicle to be compensated for the injury or loss they have suffered. Therefore, the national 
provisions governing compensation for road accidents cannot deprive those provisions of their 
effectiveness. Such would be the case specifically where, solely on the basis of the passengers’ 
contributory negligence, national rules either denied them the right to be compensated by the 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance or limited such a right in a disproportionate manner. It is 
only in exceptional circumstances that the amount of the victim’s compensation may be limited 
based on an assessment of their particular circumstances.115 
2.5.2 Scope 
The MID lays down compulsory insurance for third-party liability in respect of the use of 
vehicles normally based in the territory of EU MS. The insurance obligation covers both 
personal injuries and property damage (Art. 3 MID). Nevertheless, the MID does not regulate 
other types of insurance, such as physical injury of the driver, material damage to the vehicle, 
vehicle theft, etc.116  
‘Vehicle’ under the Directive means any motor vehicle intended for travel on land and 
propelled by mechanical power, but not running on rails, and any trailer, whether or not coupled 
(Art. 1(1) MID). The CJEU interprets this definition widely and observes that such definition 
is unconnected with the actual use of the vehicle in question.117  
The concept of ‘use of vehicles’ is not limited to road use, but it also covers any use of a vehicle 
that is consistent with its normal function, e.g. the manoeuvre of a tractor in the courtyard of a 
farm in order to bring the trailer attached to that tractor into a barn,118 a passenger opening the 
door of the vehicle while parked and damaging the vehicle parked next to it,119 a fire in a parked 
vehicle originated in its electrical circuit that causes damage to the building where it is 
parked.120 Thus, the MID covers any use of a vehicle as a means of transport.121 In addition, 
the scope of the concept of ‘use of vehicles’ does not depend on the characteristics of the terrain 
on which the motor vehicle is used, e.g. driving on public roads – it covers any use of a vehicle 
that is consistent with the normal function of that vehicle.122 As a result, the CJEU has found 
                                                 
114 ECJ case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, Minister for the Environment, Ireland, Attorney General 
and Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland, 2007 E.C.R. I-03067, paras 32-33. 
115 See ECJ case C-537/03, Katja Candolin, Jari-Antero Viljaniemi and Veli-Matti Paananen v 
Vahinkovakuutusosakeyhtiö Pohjola and Jarno Ruokoranta, 2005 E.C.R. I-05745, paras 27-30. 
116 European Commission, Motor Insurance Directive, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/banking-and-finance/insurance-and-pensions/motor-insurance_en (last visited  July 31, 2019). 
117 CJEU case C-162/13, supra note 112, para. 38. 
118 Id., para. 59. 
119 CJEU case C-648/17, BTA Baltic Insurance Company AS v Baltijas Apdrošināšanas Nams AS, 
https://curia.europa.eu , para. 48. 
120 CJEU case C-100/18, Línea Directa Aseguradora SA v Segurcaixa Sociedad Anónima de Seguros y 
Reaseguros, https://curia.europa.eu, para. 48. 
121 CJEU case C-514/16, Isabel Maria Pinheiro Vieira Rodrigues de Andrade and Fausto da Silva Rodrigues de 
Andrade v José Manuel Proença Salvador and Others, https://curia.europa.eu, para. 38 
122 Id., paras 34-36. 
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that the MID applies also to accidents of military vehicles in a military exercise area, access to 
which was prohibited for all non-military vehicles and in a part of that area which was not 
suitable for the use of wheeled vehicles.123 Moreover, the Directive covers also a vehicle parked 
on private land, solely by the choice of the owner, who no longer intends to drive the vehicle.124 
Art. 1(4)(a) defines the term ‘territory’, which means the territory of the State of which the 
vehicle bears a registration plate, irrespective of whether the plate is permanent or temporary. 
There are special rules on the notion of ‘territory’ in cases where no registration is required for 
a particular vehicle or where the vehicle does not bear any (valid) registration plate.125 
Art. 5 MID allows Member States (MS) to allow certain categories of persons and vehicles to 
be exempted from the obligation of compulsory insurance. MS have used this provision for 
exempting mainly vehicles owned by State and regional authorities or agencies, as well as 
slowly-moving vehicles used in agriculture under certain conditions, motorized wheelchairs, 
motorized bicycles under certain conditions, etc.126 Nevertheless, in such cases MS have to 
ensure that accident victims are properly compensated.127 
 
2.5.3 Minimum insurance limits 
Art. 9(1) MID establishes also minimum insurance limits. Such limits are reviewed by the 
Commission every five years after 11 June 2005, in line with the European Index of Consumer 
Prices, so that the minimum amount of cover is not eroded over time.128 They were last time 
reviewed in May 2016 and are currently as follows: (a) in the case of personal injury, a 
minimum amount of cover of € 1 220 000 per victim or € 6 070 000 per claim, whatever the 
number of victims; (b) in the case of damage to property, € 1 220 000 per claim, whatever the 
number of victims.129  
The limits for personal injury have been calculated so as to compensate fully and fairly all 
victims who have suffered very serious injuries, while taking into account the low frequency 
of accidents involving several victims and the small number of accidents in which several 
victims suffer very serious injuries in the course of one and the same event.130 
 
                                                 
123 CJEU case C-334/16, supra note 111, para. 34. 
124 CJEU case C-80/17, Fundo de Garantia Automóvel v Alina Antónia Destapado Pão Mole Juliana and 
Cristiana Micaela Caetano Juliana, para. 52. https://curia.europa.eu. 
125 See MID Art. para. 1(4)(b)-(d). 
126 See the comprehensive list of the exemptions per MS at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/banking-and-finance/insurance-and-pensions/motor-insurance_en#documents (last visited on 9 July 2018). 
127 MID Recital (10). 
128 MID Recital (13).  
129 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The adaptation in line 
with inflation of minimum amounts of cover laid down in Directive 2009/103/EC relating to insurance against 
civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such 
liability, COM (2016) 246 final (May 10, 2016). 
130 MID Recital (12). 
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2.5.4 Persons covered 
The insurance covers also liability for personal injuries to all passengers, other than the driver, 
arising out of the use of a vehicle [Art. 12(1) MID]. The fact that a passenger may be the owner 
of the vehicle is irrelevant.131 
Furthermore, it includes personal injuries and damage to property suffered by pedestrians, 
cyclists and other non-motorized users of the roads who are entitled to compensation in 
accordance with national civil law, yet without prejudice either to civil liability or to the 
quantum of damages [Art. 12(3) MID]. Civil liability and damages are governed by the national 
law of the MS and the MID does not seek to harmonize national laws on traffic liability.132 
According to Art. 13 MID, national statutory provisions and contractual clauses excluding 
liability of the insurer towards third parties are void, if they exclude the insurer’s liability for 
use or driving of vehicles by:  
(a) persons who do not have express or implied authorization to do so, unless the victims 
entered voluntarily into a vehicle, which they know it is stolen. However, in such cases MS 
may provide that the insurer is not liable, it the victims can obtain compensation for the 
damage suffered from a social security body.  
(b) persons who do not hold a license to drive the vehicle concerned;  
(c) persons who are in breach of the statutory technical requirements concerning the 
condition and safety of the vehicle concerned. 
Exclusions from liability coverage are void also in respect of claims by passengers, who knew 
or should have known that the driver was under the influence of alcohol or of any other 
intoxicating agent at the time of an accident [Art. 3(3) MID]. According to recital (23) of the 
MID preamble, the passenger is not usually in a position to assess properly the level of 
intoxication of the driver, whereas the objective of discouraging persons from driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating agents is not achieved by reducing the insurance cover for 
passengers who are victims of motor vehicle accidents. The effect of prohibiting all these 
exclusions is that victims may claim compensation from the insurer, who, after providing 
compensation, may take redress against the driver.133 Cover of such passengers under the 
vehicle’s compulsory motor insurance does not prejudge any liability they might incur pursuant 
to the applicable national legislation, nor the level of any award of damages in a specific 
accident.134  
2.5.5 Direct right of action, premium and excess 
                                                 
131 ECJ case C-537/03 (supra note 115), paras 32-35. 
132 See ECJ case C-356/05, supra note 114, paras 32-33. 
133 See ECJ case C-129/94 Criminal proceedings against Rafael Ruiz Bernáldez, 1996 E.C.R. I-1829, para. 24.  
134 MID Recital (23), in fine. 
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Art. 18 MID is important from a procedural perspective as it enables claimants to bring a direct 
action against the insurer covering the person liable. The provision aims at facilitating an 
efficient and speedy settlement of claims and avoiding costly legal proceedings.135 
Art. 14 clarifies issues about the insurance premium. A single premium should be demanded 
for the compulsory insurance coverage foreseen in the MID, which should cover the entire 
territory of the EU throughout the duration of the contract. In case that the vehicle causes an 
accident in an EU MS other that the MS in which it is registered and these MS provide for 
different insurance limits, then the insurance should cover whichever limit is higher.  
Art. 17 MID prohibits insurers from requiring third parties to bear any excess. The objective 
of this provision is to ensure a high-level protection of victims.  
2.5.6 Other provisions 
Art. 5 MID prohibits MS for carrying out regular border checks on insurance cover of vehicles 
coming out from other MS, but allows them to do so on a non-systematic basis.  
Furthermore, the MID provides for the creation of guarantee funds, to provide compensation 
for damage caused by an unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligations 
have not been satisfied (Arts 10-11 and 25). It also introduces a mechanism to compensate 
local victims of accidents caused by vehicles from another EU MS, while requiring that claims 
about an accident in an EU country other than the victim's country of residence be settled 
quickly (Arts 19-26). Moreover, policyholders are entitled to request at any time a statement 
relating to the third-party liability claims involving the vehicle or vehicles covered by the 
insurance contract at least during the preceding five years of the contractual relationship, or to 
the absence of such claims (Art.16). 
 
2.5.7 Applicability to AV 
The broad scope of the MID, as interpreted by recent judgments of the CJEU,136 includes all 
vehicles used as means of transport, irrespective of their equipment and automation level. The 
definition of ‘vehicle’ under the MID is technology neutral.137 Hence, all provisions of the MID 
mentioned above apply also in respect of AV. 
It is noteworthy that the MID applies to vehicles with a ‘driver’ and that passengers are 
considered third parties. The arising question is whether a single person on board an automated 
vehicle could qualify as a passenger. We submit that as long as the vehicle in question is not 
fully automated, i.e. falls under Level 5 SCE, the human responsible for control of the vehicle 
even in parts of the travel should always be considered to be the ‘driver’, even if in some parts 
                                                 
135 MID Recital (30). 
136 See supra notes 117 - 123. 
137 See European Commission, Inception Impact Assessment - Adaptation of the scope of Directive 2009/103/EC 
on motor insurance, 8 June 2016, at 4, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_fisma_030_motor_insurance_en.pdf (last visited July 31, 2019). 
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of the journey the vehicle operates in automated mode. Despite the operation in automated 
mode, the ‘driver’ is expected to take over control of the vehicle upon appropriate notification 
from the vehicle system or on his/her own initiative. Thus, as long as the person on board the 
vehicle may resume control at will, that person is a ‘driver’ and not a ‘passenger’.  
Especially important in practice will be the right of third parties to turn directly against the 
insurer of the vehicle. In the revision process of the MID,138 some stakeholders reiterated that 
this should not change: third parties should continue to receive compensation from the insurer 
that issued the motor insurance policy, who would then take recourse against the party 
responsible for the accident.139  
 
2.5.8 Revision of the MID and AV 
In 2016 the European Commission announced an evaluation of the MID, to identify possible 
areas in need of reform, including cases of technological developments such as automated 
vehicles. The conclusion was that the MID was fit for purpose, but certain amendments are 
deemed necessary.140 However, these did not include AV. 
As a result, the Commission laid down a proposal for a new Directive, which is intended to 
amend specific areas of the MID.141 The proposed amendments include engaging the guarantee 
funds, which compensate victims in cases of uninsured vehicles, in compensating victims in 
the event of insolvency of the insurer; measures to reduce uninsured driving; harmonization of 
the content and format of the claims statements that insurers issue at the request of 
policyholders; further harmonization of the minimum insurance limits.  
Moreover, the Commission proposes to clarify the MID’s scope in light of recent case law of 
the CJEU. The Commission’s proposal is to include a definition of the 'use of a vehicle' as any 
use of the vehicle, intended normally to serve as a means of transport, which is consistent with 
the normal function of that vehicle, irrespective of the vehicle's characteristics and irrespective 
of the terrain on which the motor vehicle is used and of whether it is stationary or in motion. 
                                                 
138 See infra, under 2.5.9. 
139
 See comments of the German Insurance Association, dated 18 August 2017, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-3714481/feedback/F6707_en?p_id=39849 
(last visited on July 31, 2019) and the UK Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, dated 17 August 2017, 
available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-
3714481/feedback/F6693_en?p_id=39849 (last visited July 31, 2019). The rest of the stakeholders who sent 
comments either stated in general that the MID applies to AV or did not comment at all thereon.  
140 European Commission, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document  
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2009/103/Ec of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in 
respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against such liability, at 1, 
SWD (2018) 248 final (Apr. 25, 2018). 
141 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/103/EC of 
the European Parliament and the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability in 
respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to ensure against such liability, COM 
(2018) 336 final (May 24, 2018). 
29 
 
As to AV, the evaluation process showed that the MID does not need any amendments to 
accommodate AV. These were found to be fully covered by the existing provisions, which are 
technology neutral, and no need to reform exists.142 
 
3. German Law 
Since 2015 the German federal government in cooperation with an interdisciplinary group of 
experts named the Automated Driving Round Table has been implementing a national strategy 
for automated and connected driving, which includes changes to the German traffic regulatory 
framework.143 In this regard, the German government set up in September 2016 an independent 
Ethics Commission, which delivered a Report on Automated and Connected Driving in June 
2017.144 Moreover, the provisions of the German Road Traffic Act (StVG) on the liability of 
vehicle keepers and drivers were amended in March 2017, to include automated driving. To 
the rest, there are rules on product liability based on the transposition of the PLD, as well as on 
special case law on the application of general tort rules to issues of defective products.  
We shall examine the new liability rules of the StVG on AV and the application of the current 
product-liability rules to AV, alongside with the recommendations of the Ethics Commission 
which provide useful guidance. 
3.1 Third-party liability of the vehicle’s keeper and driver 
In German law there are special rules on third-party liability of the vehicle keeper and driver, 
which do not affect their potential liability under other provisions, e.g. general rules on torts. 
These rules can be found in Part II (§§ 7 – 20) of the Road Traffic Act (StVG)145. In 2017 the 
rules were amended to include AV.146 
The keeper of the vehicle (Halter) is the person who uses the vehicle for her own account and 
is entitled to use the vehicle in such manner.147 The vehicle keeper is identified according to 
factual and economic criteria, e.g. a lessee can also be keeper,148 which means that the keeper 
                                                 
142 European Commission MEMO/18/3732, Frequently asked questions: Commission proposal to amend the 
Motor Insurance Directive (May 24, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3732_en.htm (last 
visited July 31, 2019). 
143 BUNDESREGIERUNG [Federal Government]‚STRATEGY FOR AUTOMATED AND CONNECTED DRIVING, Sept. 
2015, 16-18, English version at https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/EN/publications/strategy-for-automated-and-
connected-driving.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (last visited July 31, 2019). 
144 ETHICS COMMISSION, AUTOMATED AND CONNECTED DRIVING, June 2017, 
https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/EN/publications/report-ethics-commission.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (last 
visited July 31, 2019) [hereinafter German Ethics Commission]. 
145 Straßenverkehrsgesetz [StVG] [Road Traffic Act], May 3, 1909, RGBl. at 437 (Ger.), repromulgated March 
5, 2003,BGBL. I at 310, 919 (Ger.). 
146 Achtes Gesetz zur Änderung des Straßenverkehrsgesetzes [Eighth Act to Amend the Road Traffic Act], June 
16, 2017, BGBL. I at 1648. 
147 Bundesgerichtshof  [BGH]  [Federal Court of Justice] May 29, 1954, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
[NJW] 1954, 1198, para. 16 (Ger.). 
148 See Bundesgerichtshof  [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 10, 2007, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 
[NJW] 2007, 3120, para. 11 (Ger.). 
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does not necessarily coincide with the owner of the vehicle. The driver is the person who sets 
the car in motion under her own responsibility and steers it during the drive149. 
3.1.1 The rules for conventional vehicles 
According to §7 StVG, the keeper is strictly liable for any damage or injury caused by the 
vehicle, unless such damage or injury is due to force majeure (höhere Gewalt) or the vehicle 
has been stolen. §12(1) StVG limits the keeper’s liability to € 5m per accident for personal 
injuries and to € 1m per accident for property damage. In case the amount of the compensation 
due to more than one person is higher, each injured/damaged person receives an amount 
proportionally reduced [§12 (2)]. Regarding time limits, §15 StVG obliges the 
injured/damaged persons to notify the vehicle keeper within two months from the day they 
became aware of the damages and the liable person, unless the latter has obtained knowledge 
of the accident otherwise.  
§17(1)-(2) StVG provides for cases in which two or more vehicles are engaged in an accident. 
In such cases, the apportionment of liability between/among the keepers in their relation to 
each other depends on the circumstances of the case, especially regarding the extent of the 
damage caused by the respective vehicle. However, under §17(3) there is no liability in this 
regard if the accident was due to an unavoidable event, which referred neither to the quality of 
the vehicle properties (Beschaffenheit) nor to a failure of the vehicle equipment 
(Vorrichtungen). An event is ‘unavoidable’, when both the keeper and driver exercised every 
possible care.150  
§18 StVG imposes liability on the vehicle’s driver too, under the same conditions as the keeper 
with one important difference: the driver is not liable if she proves that she was not negligent. 
The rules on apportionment of liability between the vehicle keepers apply also to drivers. 
 
3.1.2 The new rules on AV 
In May 2017 the StVG was amended to include rules on AV. The new rules regulate the 
permitted modes of operation, the rights and duties of the vehicle keeper and driver, liability 
limits, and storage of vehicle data. The amendments provide also for an evaluation of the new 
rules on the permitted modes of operation, as well as on the rights and duties of the vehicle 
keeper and driver. Such evaluation shall occur after 2019 based on scientific evidence.151 
 
3.1.2.1 Permitted operation modes 
                                                 
149 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]  [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 22, 1977, VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 1977, 624, para. 
9 (Ger.).  
150 StVG §17 para. 3, sentence 2. 
151 Straßenverkehrsgesetz [StVG] [Road Traffic Act] §1c. 
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The new rules regulate vehicles that can be operated in ‘highly-automated’ (hochautomatisiert) 
or ‘fully-automated’ (vollautomatisiert) mode. These are vehicles equipped with systems able: 
(a) to exercise driving duties without the driver’s participation, (b) to respect the traffic rules, 
(c) to be overridden and deactivated by the driver, (d) to recognise the need of switching back 
to manual driving mode, (e) to signal effectively such need to the driver, and (f) to warn on 
improper use of the vehicle. The manufacturer has to declare in the vehicle’s system description 
that the vehicle fulfils the above-mentioned requirements [StVG §1a para. 2].  
Such vehicles are permitted to operate in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions 
(bestimmungsgemäß) [StVG §1a para. 1], e.g. if the automated mode is intended for use only 
in highways, then its use on other streets is not permitted.152 The manufacturer must provide 
unambiguous information on the vehicle’s equipment driver and the level of automation, so 
that the driver is aware of the intended uses of the vehicle.153  
Moreover, the new rules provide for consideration of any binding international and European 
provisions on AV,154 such as the amended provisions of the Vienna Convention and the 
provisions of Art. 20 of the Directive 2007/46/EC on type approval.155 
 
3.1.2.2 Vehicle keepers and drivers 
The keepers of ‘highly-automated’ or ‘fully-automated’ vehicles are allowed to look away from 
the traffic and leave the wheel during vehicle operation in such modes; however, they must be 
alerted to take over control of the vehicle ‘without delay’ (unverzüglich), when the vehicle 
system asks them to or when it becomes obvious from the circumstances that the requirements 
for high-automated or fully-automated driving are not met (§1b StVG), e.g. when owing to bad 
weather the vehicle’s sensors are unable to function properly.156 It is noteworthy that a technical 
problem or defect of the ADS does not exclude the keeper’s liability, as it qualifies neither as 
force majeure under §7(2) StVg nor as an unavoidable event under §17(3) StVG.157  
‘Driver’ of the vehicle is also the person that engages its high-automated or fully-automated 
mode, even if she has hands off the wheel [§1a(4) StVG]. This provision clarifies that an 
automated vehicle may not be operated without a driver.158  
If the driver of an AV has not been negligent, she will be exculpated in cases of technical 
defects, both according to the special rules of the StVG and the general rules on torts.159 Such 
                                                 
152 See  Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft ], Bundesrat Drucksachen [BR] 69/17,  7 (Ger.). 
153 Id., 14. 
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would be the case, before the trip, if the driver has ensured that the condition of the vehicle is 
good and its systems are properly configured and function without any problems.160 During the 
trip, the driver should be able to trust the ADS, but she should monitor its function to ensure 
that it is operating properly, by regularly checking the system and the road.161 The driver would 
not be liable if she can prove that the accident was due to a technical defect of the ADS and 
that she did not breach her monitoring duties in this regard.162 
The limits of the keeper’s liability for personal injury and property damage are doubled, and 
are set to € 10m and € 2m respectively [§12(1) as amended]. These limits aim at the protection 
of accident victims and have been set at these amounts, because there is no experience yet with 
claims arising from the operation of AV.163  
Consequently, the new rules channel liability to the vehicle keeper, who remains strictly liable 
and can afterwards clarify the exact apportionment with the manufacturer.164  
 
3.1.2.3 Storage of vehicle data 
To clarify who was controlling the vehicle at the time of the accident (car system or driver), a 
new §63a StVG provides that AV should store satellite data on positioning and timing each 
time the operation mode is shifted from automated to manual and vice versa. Furthermore, such 
data should be stored, also when the vehicle system calls the driver to take control or when a 
technical malfunction occurs in the vehicle system. The stored data must be communicated to 
the competent authorities upon demand and to the extent necessary for the purpose of their 
investigation. Moreover, the data must be handed over, upon demand, to third parties involved 
in an accident with an automated vehicle, to the extent necessary to enable the exercise of their 
legal rights. Data should be stored for a period of six months, unless the vehicle has been 
involved in an accident, in which case the storage period is three years. 
 
3.2 Product liability 
Apart from Directive 85/374/EEC, which has been transposed into German law through the 
Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz),165 the rules of product liability in German law 
                                                 
160 Buck-Heeb & Dieckman, supra note 157, 71; Ebers, supra note 59, 115. 
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163 Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft ], supra note 152, 8. 
164Id., 8. 
165 It is noteworthy that §10 para. 1 of the German Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz) caps the 
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have been developed mainly through special interpretation of the general rules of the German 
Civil Code (BGB)166 on torts167 by the Federal Supreme Court (BGH). 
The most important provision in this regard starting point is §823 BGB (1) which provides 
A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, 
health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to make 
compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this. 
 
3.2.1 Tortious liability of the manufacturer 
§823(1) BGB is the German equivalent of the common-law rules on the tort of negligence. 
In product liability cases, the core of the manufacturer’s unlawful behavior is the 
manufacturer’s duty of care to the users of the product (Verkehrssicherungspflicht), the 
negligent (or intentional) breach of which may result in its duty to compensate victims.168  
The duty of care consists of preventing risks arising from the use of the product, when such 
prevention is considered necessary according to public perception (Verkehrsauffassung) and 
expectations, which are examined case by case.169  
The notion of product includes software.170 
 
3.2.1.1 Liable persons 
Liable is the person that manufactures and places into circulation a product. The end 
manufacturer is responsible for the safe construction of the end product.171 They may also be 
liable for components manufactured by a supplier.172 In this regard, sample tests may suffice, 
as long as the components do not influence significantly the safety of the end product.173  
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Component part manufacturers bear separate liability for damage due to defects of the 
components,174 as well as for providing to the manufacturer of the end product inadequate 
information on the use and the specifications of the component.175 In the context of AV, 
component manufacturers may be responsible for the software of the AV or parts thereof and 
the sensors of the vehicle. 
The distributor of the manufacturer can also be held liable under special circumstances, e.g. 
when the distributor is a domestic affiliate of a foreign manufacturer and has undertaken to 
provide information to the parent company.176 Such instances may not be unusual in the case 
of AV, the manufacturers of which will have affiliates entrusted with collecting data on the use 
of the product in the local market. 
The assemblers of the end product may be liable like manufacturers, because the assembly 
procedure results in a new product and is deemed a production process.177 Nevertheless, it is 
required that the defect could be detected during the assembly, which does not entail a duty of 
assemblers to examine thoroughly all the products delivered to them.178 
 
3.2.1.2 Categories of defect 
The manufacturer’s duty of care and the corresponding product defects can be categorized into 
design defects (Konstruktionsfehler), manufacturing defects (Fabrikationsfehler), failure to 
warn (Instruktionsfehler) and product monitoring defects (Produktbeobachtungsfehler). 
 
3.2.1.2.1 Design defects 
A design defect exists when the product’s design does not correspond to the safety required 
under the technical standards and knowledge (state of the art) at the time it was released to the 
market.179 Such defect means that the product as to its conception does not offer the required 
safety.180 Compliance with the existing technical standards, e.g. in the form of certification, 
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does not preclude negligence, as such standards lay down only the minimum requirements.181 
Practicability of additional safety measures in terms of a cost-benefit analysis is an additional 
factor to be considered. At the same time, manufacturers do not have to apply safety measures 
the efficiency of which has not been tested yet.182 Nonetheless, the product must provide always 
a minimum level of safety.183  
In the context of AV, design defects could have the form of failure of the ADS to conceive and 
interpret its environment, in other words failure in situational awareness,184 failure to cooperate 
and communicate with other road users and with the human driver,185 navigation defects (route 
planning and localization)186 and failure to provide functional safety. The latter consists of 
failure to ensure appropriate security and integrity of the vehicle data,187 including on-board 
failure diagnosis.188 This means that back-up (redundant) systems should be in place to 
substitute for the system failure or at least bring the DDT safely into an end, until the human 
driver takes over.189 Thus, in emergency situations the ADS should automatically enter into a 
‘safe condition’.190 
Should the system instruct the driver to resume control of the vehicle, the manufacturer should 
consider human factors.191 Consequently, ADS should be designed in a way that sudden 
handover of control to the human driver is excluded. The ADS should be adopted to human 
communicative behavior192 and allow the human sufficient time to resume control; if this is 
impossible the ADS should retain control.193  
To enable allocation of liability, it must be clearly distinguishable whether the ADS has control 
of the vehicle and whether the driver retains accountability with the option of overruling the 
system. The human-machine interface should clearly indicate at any time who is in charge 
(human or ADS) and whether there was a handover request by the ADS, while such information 
should be documented and stored.194 
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The German Ethics Commission recommends that AV are designed to drive in a defensive and 
anticipatory manner, posing as little risk as possible to vulnerable road users. Critical situations, 
especially dilemma situations, in which AV have to decide between two evils, should be 
avoided in the first place.195 Human life enjoys priority and as such AV should be programmed 
to accept damage to animals or property in a conflict, if this means that personal injury can be 
prevented.196 Although it is prohibited to offset victims against one another, general 
programming to reduce the number of personal injuries may be justifiable.197 The parties 
involved in the creation of mobility risks should not sacrifice non-involved parties.198 
Nonetheless, abstract guidance in ‘dilemma situations’ is not possible. The German Ethics 
Commission suggests that an independent public-sector agency can be entrusted with the 
process of the lessons learned in specific cases.199 
Besides, the manufacturer has to protect third parties also from foreseeable misuses of its 
product, such as operation outside the ODD of the AV.200 Although §1a StVG permits the 
operation of AV only within their ODD, §1a(2)(6) prescribes that the ADS should provide the 
driver with a warning that the ADS is being operated outside its ODD, which results in a 
respective duty of the manufacturer.201  
 
3.2.1.2.2 Manufacturing defects 
A manufacturing defect occurs when the design of the product is safe, but an error occurs at the 
production procedure, caused by the manufacturer’s failure to organize the production 
procedure appropriately.202 A special category of manufacturing defects are the ‘outliers’ 
(Ausreißer), which are defects that cannot be avoided despite all necessary precautions and, 
therefore, entail no liability.203 
As to AV, manufacturers need to have in place appropriate quality-management procedures to 
ensure that the appropriate safety of the vehicle, e.g. control of the production machines, of the 
raw materials and the production procedures, testing of the vehicle sensors and software etc.204 
However, the self-learning abilities of ADS entail that manufacturers need to have in place 
more rigorous testing procedures.205 
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3.2.1.2.3 Failure to warn 
The failure to warn deals with the omission of the manufacturer to warn sufficiently the users 
of its product on possible dangers from its use.206 Such duty concerns mainly products the use 
of which entails dangers for the users that cannot be prevented and may be unknown to the 
average user.207 The manufacturer should also inform the user on the risks of the product and 
on its correct use, in some cases also on its incorrect use.208  
The manufacturer should inform the keeper/driver on the ODD of the vehicle and its limits, as 
§1a StVG indicates.209 It should also inform the driver if currently the operation of the vehicle 
in outside the ODD and indicate that the driver should take over.210 Especially important are 
the instructions regarding the human-machine interface: the human driver should know how to 
activate and deactivate the ADS or its components, if the ADS or components are activated and 
function properly or not, and how she is supposed to react in each case.211 Important are also 
the instructions regarding maintenance: the manufacturer should inform the user on the need to 
keep sensors clean, explain how software updates should be installed and warn on potential risk 
due to inappropriate maintenance, e.g. security risks in cases of outdated software.212 
The instructions should be provided at least in the form of a user manual. However, in many 
cases this may not suffice, because it is very usual that users read only part of the instructions. 
In view of the risks created for innocent third parties therefrom, it has been proposed that the 
manufacturer uses interactive instructions in the on-board computer.213  
3.2.1.2.4 Failure to monitor the product 
Failure in product monitoring concerns the manufacturer’s failure to (a) observe the results of 
the product’s use, (b) follow the development of the technical and scientific knowledge and (c) 
receive appropriate measures, such as repairs, replacements, issuing warnings or even changing 
production methods.214 The manufacturer has to monitor the interaction of its product with 
other products and accessories manufactured by third parties and issue adequate warnings.215 
It has to actively collect information regarding technological developments and potential risks 
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of its product.216 It is also under duty to monitor such issues regarding competitive products, 
because the pertinent problems may be transferable to its own.217 The more risks entails the use 
of a product, the higher are the requirements to the manufacturer to monitor the safety of the 
product according to the current level of the scientific knowledge and to react 
accordingly.218Moreover, in extreme cases, especially when there is risk of injury or death, 
there may be a duty to recall products.219  
The application of these principles to AV entails that manufacturers of AV are obliged to 
continuously optimize their systems, observe the already delivered ADS and improve them 
wherever this is technologically possible and reasonable.220 This includes monitoring the 
interaction of the ADS with products and software of third parties through sample tests and 
problem reports.221  
Furthermore, to the extent permitted by the data protection legislation222, the AV manufacturer 
can collect software data from its vehicle, regarding possible failures, glitches, etc.223  
As soon as the manufacturer knows about potential problems and risks, it should issue warnings 
to the users, which could have the form of messages on the on-board computer.224 Developing 
and releasing software updates is also included here.225 However, a duty of the manufacturer 
to offer a software update and not just a warning should be accepted only in cases of serious 
risk of injury to third parties.226 To the extent that such updates alter the approved specifications 
of the vehicle, they may need to be approved by the competent authorities, which can take 
some time. Such unavoidable delays in releasing the software should be taken into account, 
when establishing potential violations of the manufacturer’s monitoring duty.227  
 
3.2.1.3 Damage 
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Recoverable can be any personal damage, including pain and suffering, or damage to property, 
other than the defective product itself.228 However, compensation for damage to the defective 
product itself and related loss of income are not recoverable under the law of torts.229  
A thorny problem is damage caused by a component to the whole product, known as ‘spreading 
defect’ (weiterfressender Mangel). Such damage may be compensated, if the defective 
component can be functionally separated from the rest of the product and the damage to the 
rest of the product resulted from the connection with the rest of the product.230 
Punitive damages are not recoverable in Germany, because they do not have compensatory 
character and raise serious constitutional concerns.231 
In the case of AV, damage caused to the vehicle itself by defective sensors will be recoverable, 
as these can be easily removed and replaced. However, in case of defective ADS software the 
damage will be of the same kind (stoffgleich), as the software is a central part of an AV.232 
Nonetheless, the situation may be different in case of mere assisted-driving systems (Level 2 
automation), the software of which may be an autonomous component of the vehicle.233 
  
3.2.1.4 Burden of proof 
Claimants must prove the existence of defect, their damage and the causal link between the 
defect and the damage.  
As to design and manufacturing defects, German courts require manufacturers to prove that 
there was no breach of duty of care and no negligence in the design and the production process 
of the product (e.g. the defect was an ‘outlier’ or it was not discoverable according to the state 
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of the art at the time it was released to the market).234 They also need to prove that each 
employee was carefully selected and supervised.235  
Regarding the failure to warn, German courts draw a distinction on the basis of the time that 
the warnings should have been issued.236 If they relate to the time of placing the product to the 
market, manufacturers have to prove that there was no breach of their duty of care and no 
negligence, because they have the necessary overview in the production process and the related 
access to information. Nevertheless, if the failure to warn is based on facts, scientific findings 
and discoveries subsequent to placing the product in the market, which are also accessible to 
the claimant, the claimant has to prove that there was a breach of duty of care; once this is 
proven, manufacturers have to prove lack of negligence, e.g. because the pertinent state of the 
scientific art and knowledge in their domain at that time did not allow the identification of the 
exact danger or the methods to avoid it.  
As to claims for defects of AV, claimants will have to prove the causal link between the defect 
and the damage, which will be a very difficult task, because the accident may be due to factors 
outside the manufacturer’s control, such as defective software updates from third parties, 
insufficient maintenance of the vehicle, cyber attacks etc.237 Especially as to design and 
manufacturing defects, claimants should prove that the defect existed at the time the vehicle 
was placed in the market. In view of self-learning abilities of the AV this is very difficult to 
prove.238 
At the same time, manufacturers of AV will have a heavy burden of proof to meet as to non-
negligent behavior because of the strict requirements as to AV.239 Regarding learned behavior 
of ADS, they will have to prove that they could neither predict it nor avert it.240 
Consequently, the current system creates serious proof difficulties for both claimants and 
defendants, despite the obligatory use of the Event Data Recorder under §63a StVG. This can 
undermine compensation of victims241 and increase litigation cost. Therefore, it has been 
proposed to impose risk liability on AV manufacturers, which means that they should be liable 
for all damages caused by the ADS.242 However, such legislative intervention would be 
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possible only at the EU level in view of the full harmonization effect of the Product Liability 
Directive.243 
3.3 Insurance 
Insurance issues regarding motor vehicles are regulated mainly in the Compulsory Insurance 
Act (PflVG)244 and in the Motor Vehicle Compulsory Insurance Order (KfzPflVV)245. To the 
rest, the general provisions of the Insurance Contract Act (VVG)246 apply. The applicable 
provisions of these pieces of legislation transpose the MID into German law. In this section, 
we will focus on the particularities of German law. 
3.3.1 Scope and insurance limits 
§1 PflVG lays down the duty of the keepers of automotive vehicles to have in place third-party 
liability insurance covering themselves, the owners and the drivers of the vehicles. §5(2) PflVG 
obliges insurers to conclude insurance contracts with the persons mentioned in §1. The 
definition of ‘vehicle’ is the same under the MID, thus it comprises AV.247 The interpretation 
of the term ‘use of a vehicle’ does not differ from the MID. It includes all motor vehicles, 
irrespective of their technical configuration and whether there are driven by a human driver; 
thus it includes AV.248 The prescribed minimum insurance limits are € 7 500 000 for personal 
injuries, € 1 220 000 for property damage and € 50 000 for pure economic loss.249  
 
3.3.2 Exclusions of coverage 
§117(1) VVG provides that the insurer remains liable towards third parties, irrespective of the 
release from liability towards the policyholder. The only exceptions thereto are the cases 
foreseen in §4 KfzPflVV and §103 VVG. 
§4 KfzPflVV permits exclusions of coverage only in specific cases, which deal with property 
damage. Thus, a general exclusion of coverage for damage resulting from AV is not allowed.250 
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Furthermore, §103 VVG releases the insurer from any liability, if the insured has caused 
intentionally the damage. In such cases, third parties will be compensated by the Guarantee 
Fund, according to §12(1) PflVG.251 
 
3.4 Conclusion on German law de lege lata 
Current German law on AV channels liability to the vehicle keeper, who bears strict limited 
liability, pursuant to the newly inserted provisions of the Street Traffic Law (StVG). Liable up 
to the same limits can also be the vehicle’s driver for negligence. 
Manufacturers of AV and components may be held either strictly liable according to the 
Product Liability Act (ProdHG), which transposes Directive 85/374/EEC, or liable for 
negligence according to the general tort liability provisions (§823 BGB) as these have been 
interpreted for product-liability cases. In both cases, their liability is unlimited. 
Third-party liability insurance for AV is governed by the provisions of national law that 
incorporate the MID and does not present any significant particularities. 
 
4. English law 
In English law there are no special liability rules on owners, drivers and manufacturers of AV 
at present. Thus, such liability is governed by rules applicable to road negligence and product 
liability.  
Nevertheless, the recently enacted Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018252 provides for 
liability of the insurers of such vehicles. At the same time the English Law Commission and 
the Scottish Law Commission are reviewing the current regulatory framework for AV in the 
UK. A consultation process is ongoing, which is scheduled to end in 2021 with the publication 
of the final recommendations. So far, a preliminary consultation paper on safety assurance and 
legal liability has been published,253 with regard to which answers have been received and 
analyzed.254 Another two consultation papers are being prepared: one on automated road 
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passenger services, expected in Fall 2019 and one in 2020, which will draw on responses to the 
two previous papers to formulate overarching proposal.255  
We shall examine first the general rules on third-party liability and insurance, and their 
applicability to AV. Subsequently we will examine the new special provisions on liability of 
insurers of AV, alongside with the business framework of insurance of AV in the UK.  
 
4.1. Road negligence  
English law provides for a system of fault liability in respect of road accidents even in situations 
where motor vehicles cause death or injury to pedestrians or cyclists. As a result, the claimant 
is required to prove the driver’s negligence, namely to establish that i) he was owed a duty of 
care; ii) that the driver breached that duty; and iii) that damage was caused as a result of the 
breach. 
 
4.1.1. Duty of care 
Whether a duty of care exists is rarely an issue of concern in road accidents and in most cases 
its existence is affirmed without any problem.256 The driver is required to use reasonable care 
to avoid causing damage to persons, vehicles or property, i.e. the care that an ordinary skilful 
driver would have exercised.257 The test is objective and “… independent of the idiosyncrasies 
of the particular person whose conduct is in question”.258 As such, learner drivers are not 
assessed by reference to a lower level of care courtesy of their inexperience.259  
  
4.1.2. Breach of the duty of care 
What behaviour constitutes breach of the duty of care has been judicially shaped over the years, 
with courts viewing it as a predominantly fact-based exercise.260 This is particularly obvious 
in the treatment of The Road Traffic Act 1988, the public law instrument which sets the road 
traffic rules and contains predominantly criminal law sanctions. 261 Failure to observe its 
provisions does not necessarily mean that the defendant has been negligent and conversely, 
compliance therewith does not necessarily absolve the defendant.262 Consequently, the mere 
fact that the defendant was driving in a negligent fashion does not mean that he can be regarded 
                                                 
255 See https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/automated-vehicles/ (last visited July 31, 2019). 
256 PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW  69 (8th ed. 2013). 
257 CHARLESWORTH & PERCY ON NEGLIGENCE § 10-191 (Christopher Walton et al. eds., 13th ed. 2017). 
258 Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [1943] A.C. 448, 457 (Lord Macmillan) (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.).  
259 Nettleship v. Weston [1971] 2 Q.B. 691 (Eng).  
260 Foskett v. Mistry [1984] R.T.R. 1 (Eng). 
261 Charlesworth & Percy, supra note 257, § 10-199.  
262 CLERK & LINDSHELL ON TORTS § 8-202 (Michael Jones et al eds. 22nd ed. 2017).  
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as liable in negligence, if an accident occurs which could not have been prevented even without 
negligence.263  
Still, the following situations of breach can be identified: “(i) failing to keep any, or proper, 
look out; (ii) failing to heed the presence of the other road user in time properly or at all; (iii) 
failing to stop, slow down properly or at all; (iv) in the circumstances driving too fast (for 
example given the traffic, weather, visibility and other conditions pertaining at the time); (v) 
failing to steer or otherwise manage the vehicle so as to avoid the collision; (vi) sudden stopping 
without good cause; (vii) failing to take note of obstructions on the road; (viii) parking a vehicle 
in such a way as to cause a dangerous situation; (ix) over-taking or other manoeuvres when 
unsafe to do so; (x) driving or continuing to drive where the driver knew or ought to have 
known that he was ill or his faculties were otherwise adversely affected, for example, by lack 
of sleep; (xi) driving a vehicle notwithstanding a reasonably discoverable defect affecting its 
control or other safe use; (xii) failing adequately or at all to have adequate regard for the safety 
of pedestrians or other road users…”.264  
 
4.1.3 Contributory negligence  
Contributory negligence is regulated by the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 
which requires the reduction to the damages to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable 
having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage.265 The inquiry is fact 
sensitive, but the general attitude of English courts in cases of injuries to pedestrians is that 
usually the attribution of causative potency to the driver will be greater than that of the 
pedestrian and thus courts consistently apply a higher burden on the motorist.266 This is so as 
“the potential destructive disparity between the parties could be taken into account as an aspect 
of blameworthiness”.267  
This rationale was apparent in the recent case of Jackson v. Murray where a 13-year old was 
hit by the car driven by the defendant while attempting to cross a rural, unlit, two-way road 
from the rear of a minibus.268 The Supreme Court reversing the decision of the Inner House 
(where contributory negligence was assessed at 70%) opted for an equal apportionment based 
on the driver’s level of culpability: “ if [the defendant] had slowed to a reasonable speed in the 
circumstances and had kept a proper look-out, he would have avoided her”.269 Having said that, 
English courts do not hesitate to award a higher degree of contributory negligence in “stepping 
out” cases. 270  
                                                 
263 ROBERT MERKIN & MAGGIE HEMSWORTH, THE LAW OF MOTOR INSURANCE § 4-12 (2nd ed. 2015).  
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Such an approach can be explained by the preference for a fault-liability regime: since the duty 
is to drive with reasonable care, a motorist will seldom be held liable for the outcome of a split-
second decision where a number of courses of action are open to him and each has potential 
disadvantages.271 It is plausible that the deployment of AV operating in autonomous modes 
will prompt English courts to reconsider their approach to “stepping out” cases in favour of 
pedestrians. This might be the case as AV in Levels 4 and 5 of automation will probably come 
with the ability (or at least the promise) of having faster (than the average human driver) 
braking reaction times.  
 
4.1.4 Evaluation  
It has been argued that English courts have consistently imposed on the drivers a high standard 
to reflect the potential dangerousness of the car.272 Yet, this tendency is not to be confused with 
a judicially-driven attempt to elevate the standard to one of strict liability. On the contrary, the 
evidence suggests that English courts strive to safeguard the reasonable-care requirement by 
“caution[ing] against liberal use of hindsight…which elevate[s] the standard of care to a form 
of guarantee of safety or a counsel of perfection…”.273 
It is difficult to estimate the effect that the fault principle has on the (un)successful recovery of 
compensation for road accidents. What seems to be beyond doubt is that the “number of 
successful tort claims has increased fourfold since the 1970s”.274 Beyond this estimate, it is 
open to debate how many victims are prevented from receiving compensation because of the 
requirement to prove the fault of the driver with academics supporting the view that it ranges 
from “a significant (although perhaps relatively small) proportion”275 to “large numbers”.276 
Still, Governments over the years have retained the negligence standard, despite official 
proposals for the introduction of strict liability or no-fault compensation. 277 
It is unlikely that the current British Government will propose a change of the current liability 
system for non-automated vehicles for several reasons. Firstly, question marks have been raised 
about the economic efficiencies of no-fault compensation schemes for road users.278 Secondly, 
it is becoming more difficult to justify creating no-fault compensation schemes for selective 
groups of victims, such as road users.279 Such ambiguities are likely to be picked up by a 
Government that sees no major problem with the fault-liability framework. Thirdly, the 
Government brushed aside the proposals for an overhaul of the liability system in the recent 
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consultation on AV.280 This attitude is not surprising, if one considers that the response of the 
Government to the increase of car insurance premiums in 2012 was to reform the funding of 
personal injury litigation rather than the liability framework.281  
Instead, the Government mandated the Law Commission to undertake a three-year review of 
the legal framework governing the operation of AV, including the issue of liability.282 Its 
selective approach in terms of liability reforms demonstrates a reluctance to upset the basic 
rules of allocating risk and liability in accidents caused by conventional vehicles. It is keen to 
provide a stricter liability regime for AV on the basis that manufacturers, insurers and/or 
owners of the vehicles are better equipped to reduce the risk of accidents and bear their costs. 
Yet, it is at pains to retain the status quo with respect to unconventional vehicles.  
 
4.2 Insurance  
4.2.1. Compulsory insurance obligation  
The fault liability system does not stand alone. It is supported by the UK motor insurance 
market which is the “largest and most competitive general insurance line of business, 
accounting for £15.6 billion gross written premium in 2015”.283  
The framework of compulsory insurance against third party risks is found in Part VI of the 
Road Traffic Act 1988,284 which essentially derives from the Consolidated Motor Insurance 
Directive 2009/103/EC.285 The basic provision is Section 143(1)(a), which prohibits a person 
to use a motor vehicle on a road or other public space in Great Britain without insurance for 
risks caused by, or arising out of, the use of that vehicle. Such risk regard liability in respect of 
death of or bodily injury to third parties, including passengers, and damage to third party 
property.286 This provision is supplemented by Section 143(1)(b) 2 which prohibits a person to 
permit or cause anyone else to use the motor vehicle unless the said third party insurance is in 
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force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that other person.287 If the owner of a vehicle 
permits it to be used by an uninsured driver and damage is caused by such user, then the owner 
is not only committing a criminal offence but is also liable for the ensuing damages as a result 
of the breach of the statutory duty to insure.288 In Norman v. Aziz it was clarified that the Motor 
Insurance Bureau Agreement did not affect the cause of action for breach of statutory duty.289 
Having said that, the Court of Appeal recently held in Sahin v. Havard that it is not compulsory 
for insurers to provide cover for such liability under Section 145 and are not required to satisfy 
a judgment arising out of such liability under Section 151.290  
In Section 145(3) the Act identifies the minimum, compulsory cover to be offered by motor 
policies: a policy must insure “such person, persons or classes of persons as may be specified 
in the policy in respect of any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the 
death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the 
use of the vehicle on a road or other public place” in Great Britain and in the EU.291 English 
law does not provide for a limit to the liability insured for death and personal injury, yet a limit 
of £1,200,000 per accident in respect of third party property damage has been imposed.292 . 
Under Section 161(3) any reference to an accident includes a reference to two or more causally 
related accidents.293 The intention of using such an aggregating provision is to create “a ceiling 
for all property damage flowing from an occurrence such as, for example, a multiple 
collision”,294 although this is debatable.295  
 
4.2.2 Prohibited restrictions of cover  
Section 145(3) must be read in conjunction with Section 148(2) which provides a list of 
restrictions that are not available to insurers when handling third party claims that fall into the 
compulsory cover of Section 145. They are widely drafted and include any term that refers to 
(a) the age or physical or mental condition of persons driving the vehicle,(b) the condition of 
the vehicle, (c) the number of persons that the vehicle carries, (d) the weight or physical 
characteristics of the goods that the vehicle carries,(e) the time at which or the areas within 
which the vehicle is used, (f) the horsepower or cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle,(g) 
the carrying on the vehicle of any particular apparatus, or (h) the carrying on the vehicle of any 
particular means of identification.296 
Section 148(2) works in practice as follows: “There is no prohibition on the policy containing 
those exclusions or restrictions, and if it does they are fully operative in first party claims. The 
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effect of the legislation is to render the relevant terms unenforceable where the assured is faced 
with a claim by a third party in respect of which he seeks indemnification from his insurers. 
The terms which are negative are not identified by class in the legislation and would appear to 
include all provisions whether expressed as restrictions on cover, warranties and conditions 
precedent to cover or to liability”.297 Upon payment to the third party, Section 148(4) gives the 
right to insurers to recover the amount paid despite the restrictions from the insured.298  
 
4.2.3 Main avenue for recovery 
Section 151 constitutes the main avenue for recovery of compensation by a third party under 
the compulsory cover of Section 145. In essence, it provides that insurers are required to satisfy 
a judgment that the third party obtained against the insured. This section imposes a far-reaching 
obligation on insurers, as it makes them liable even in situations where they do not have an 
obligation to provide cover for the injury or damage under the policy.  
They are required to satisfy it a) “[n]otwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or 
cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the policy”;299  
b) notwithstanding that the user was uninsured300 or was unidentified301 or used it without 
consent, including stealing it302 or did not have a driving licence; 303 c) notwithstanding the 
injuries or damage to the third party were deliberately inflicted provided that the policy 
provided cover against this risk.304 In the case of theft, the liability of insurers to the passenger 
is subject to the condition that the passenger did not know or had no reason to believe that i) 
the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken until after the commencement of his journey, 
and ii) could not reasonably have been expected to have alighted from the vehicle.305 
To avoid liability under Section 151, the insurers have available the limited defences of Section 
152, namely that a) they were given no notice of the proceedings before or within 7 days of 
their commencement;306 b) execution on the judgment was stayed pending an appeal;307 c) the 
policy was cancelled by mutual consent prior to the accident;308 and d) a declaration was 
obtained by the insurers before or within 7 days of the commencement of the main proceedings 
that they are entitled to avoid the policy on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure 
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of a material fact, or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular.309 
In these cases the third party will be compensated by the Motor Insurance Bureau.  
In sections 151(7) and (8) the Act makes provision for the insurer’s rights of recourse. When 
the insurers are liable to pay compensation to a third party caused by a non-insured user, 
Section 151(8) gives them the right to recover the amount either from the uninsured driver or 
from the person that permitted the use of the vehicle by an uninsured driver.310 The scope of 
this section was restricted by the case of Churchill Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Wilkinson where the 
injured passengers had permitted their cars to be used by uninsured drivers giving insurers the 
right to recover from them any sums payable to them as third parties.311 Following referral to 
the CJEU, the Court of Appeal ruled that Section 151(8) (b) allows recovery from the insured 
who has permitted the use of his vehicle by an uninsured driver only when the court considers 
that it is “proportionate…on the basis of the circumstances of the case”,312 namely “the 
circumstances in which the permission was given, the nature of the accident and the overall 
competence of the driver”.313  
When the insurers are liable to pay compensation to a third party caused by an insured user, s 
151(7)(b) provides that they can recover from the insured the sum that exceeds the amount for 
which they would otherwise be liable under the policy. If the loss was caused by a person 
driving without a valid licence, insurer would be able to recover the entire amount courtesy of 
Section 151(7)(a).  
Under Regulation 3 of the European Communities (Rights against Insurers) Regulations 2002, 
English law also permits direct actions from third parties against motor insurers, without the 
need to obtain judgment under Section 151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Yet, the main 
advantage of Section 151 is that it provides cover in the situation where the third party suffered 
loss from an unauthorised user, namely an uninsured, unidentified, or user without consent. 
This provision has also reduced the importance of the Motor Insurance Bureau with respect to 
uninsured or unidentified drivers and the action for breach of statutory duty.314  
 
4.3 Negligence liability for defective products 
The landmark case Donoghue v Stevenson established the duty of manufacturers who sell 
products that are intended to reach consumers in the form that these left their premises, with 
no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence 
of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the 
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consumer's life or property, to take reasonable care towards consumers.315 Tortious liability for 
defective products is independent of any contractual claim.316 
  
4.3.1 Capacity to sue and to be sued 
Following Donoghue v Stevenson, the duty of care is owned not only to end users, but also to 
persons in their proximity.317 
Liable persons can be end manufacturers,318 component manufacturers,319 suppliers if their 
functions exceed simple distribution,320 repairers321 etc. 
 
4.3.2 Scope of the duty 
The risks posed by the product must have been known or at least reasonably foreseeable by 
the manufacturer.322 
Moreover, the user must have used to product exactly as it left the manufacturer, that is in all 
material features, and use it as it was intended to be used.323 
The duty of care arises specifically in the context of latent defects, where there is no opportunity 
for intermediate examination that would have revealed the defect.324 It suffices that a third party 
could have discovered the defect in course of a reasonably anticipated examination.325 The 
manufacturers’ duty is continuous. This means that manufacturers have to monitor their 
products, even after they have been put into circulation, for dangers that may arise from their 
use, issue adequate post-marketing warnings where necessary, and, in extreme cases, recall 
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defective products.326 Nevertheless, there is no duty to warn for obvious dangers arising from 
ordinary use.327 
 
4.3.3 Breach of duty 
Manufacturers owe a duty to take reasonable care, which means that they do not have to ensure 
absolute safety of their products.328 However, in some circumstances the “highest level” of care 
will be required by the manufacturer.329 
The risk of the damage must have been foreseeable at the time of that the damage occurred.330 
Thus, there will be no liability where the scientific and technical knowledge at that time did 
not enable the discovery of the defect.331  
English courts have been hesitant to distinguish between design defects and manufacturing 
defects,332 also referred to as ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ products respectively.333 
Nonetheless, such distinction has been found useful by some authors, as it brings clarity to 
handling the cases.334 There have also been cases for inadequate instructions and warnings.335 
As to proof of breach of duty, English courts are hesitant to accept the application of res ipsa 
loquitur in product liability cases.336 Nevertheless, in some instances they accept the use of 
inferences from known facts for the establishment of the defendant’s negligence.337 The 
claimant does not have to indicate the particular individual responsible for the defect in the 
product nor the particular act of negligence.338  
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In the context of AV, it is very likely that AV manufacturers will be required to exercise the 
“highest level” of care towards third parties, as has been the case in accidents involving 
conventional vehicles.339 The level of scientific and technical knowledge at the time of the 
alleged breach will be a crucial factor. To the rest, the various aspects of product defects under 
English law do not differ significantly from the fault-based regime in Germany. It is expected 
that manufacturers of AV will incur liability under similar circumstances concerning design, 
manufacturing and instruction defects, as well as product monitoring duties.340 
Proving breach of duty of care will be challenging in some cases, given the self-learning 
abilities of AV. Given that English courts are already reluctant to accept application of the res 
ipsa loquitur in product liability cases, such reluctance could only increase as to highly complex 
products like AV. Nonetheless, this does not preclude that English courts will accept inferences 
to establish the manufacturer’s negligence.  
 
4.3.4 Damage 
Recoverable damage includes personal injury and damage to property other than the defective 
product. Thus, damage to the defective product itself and pure economic loss are not 
recoverable.341 Pre-emptive repairs of the defect are not recoverable under tort,342 while 
damage arising from continued use of the defective article, after the claimant had discovered 
the defect, may bar recovery.343  
English courts are very hesitant to award exemplary (punitive) damages and do so only in 
extreme cases.344 Thus far, no punitive damages have been awarded for product liability cases. 
The English and Scottish Law Commissions remark that only a very determined claimant 
would be prepared to turn down an offer of compensatory damages to pursue a claim on the 
remote chance that aggravated or punitive damages would be awarded, because a claimant who 
rejects an offer under Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules and then receives no more than the 
rejected offer would be liable for the costs of the action from the date of the rejection.345 
 
4.3.5 Causation 
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Recoverable are only damages for which the claimant establishes, on the balance of 
probabilities, that they are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach of duty.346 No 
causation is proven if other probable causes have not been eliminated.347 
In accidents involving AV, proof of causation by claimants is expected to be challenging, given 
the complexity and the self-learning abilities of AV. Evidentiary alleviations provided by 
courts to claimants could be crucial for the success of claims. 
 
4.4 Liability, insurance and automated vehicles in the UK  
4.4.1 A new insurance paradigm  
The Bank of England predicts that the introduction of AV will cause the motor insurance 
market to contract by 21% by 2040.348 This contraction is expected to come from the ability of 
AV technology to reduce low-speed accidents, thereby removing many of the smaller bumper-
to-bumper type incidents.349 Nonetheless, the Bank estimates that that the cost of treating 
severe bodily injury claims will continue to increase relative to property damage and 
technology inflation.350  
It is also becoming increasingly obvious to insurers that AV manufacturers consider entering 
the insurance market in the future. The main reason behind such development is to use premium 
income to counterbalance the erosion of the after-markets parts business, which is expected as 
a result of the fewer accidents.351 The argument goes that car manufacturers already “use 
financing and warranties to enhance profits at the point of sale; insurance could be a similar 
business that provides for some annuity in revenues and continuity in customers 
relationships”.352 It has been suggested that this can be achieved by either acting “as an 
insurance company with many functions outsourced” or even by becoming “a fully integrated 
insurance company that owns and runs the distribution, operations, and financial 
management”.353 Either way manufacturers i) will not be required to share driving data with 
third party insurers; and ii) will be able to “price insurance more precisely and share safety 
gains with clients”.354 Such a development has also been noted by the Bank of England which 
expects that synergies between car manufacturers and insurers will increase.355 The implication 
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is that insurers who fail to reach agreement with manufacturers will find it challenging to 
sustain their business model.356 
The bottom line is that the motor insurance market is destined for a transformation in terms of 
market structure, ways of placing and rating risks, as well as handling claims. In that respect, 
we are witnessing a paradox. On the one hand, insurers are becoming aware that the use of AV 
will require a significant transformation of the sector with many being forced to quit the motor 
insurance market. On the other hand, the new technology promises to significantly reduce 
costs, which is expected increase margins of profitability for the insurers that adapt to the new 
reality.  
British insurers have opted to tackle this paradox by supporting the development of AV 
technologies either in partnership with car manufacturers or by undertaking their own research 
and development.357 Partnering with car manufacturers on AV trials is crucial as it helps them 
understand the impact on vehicle accident rates.358 At the same time, it offers them the 
opportunity to identify ways to retain the customer relationship regarding insurance. It enables 
them to offer an insurance product that is appealing enough to dissuade car manufacturers from 
creating a one-stop-shop for car and insurance sales. What is clear, though, is that AV 
technology will cause disruption in the insurance market and what we are currently witnessing 
is its slow transformation.  
 
4.4.2. A new framework for insurance law  
The British Parliament passed the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 to facilitate the 
development of AV and the evolution of the insurance market. The aim of the Government is 
to make as little changes as possible to the existing compulsory scheme of insurance having 
rejected the proposal for an overhaul of the motor insurance and liability framework.359  
 
4.4.2.1. Registry of AV and levels of automation 
The Act provides for the creation of a registry of AV that fall into its scope.360 It does not 
indicate the level of automation that a vehicle will be required to have to be registered, but 
states that AV will be listed if they are “…designed or adapted to be capable, in at least some 
circumstances or situations, of safely driving themselves”.361 The intention is that the registry 
will cover vehicles that allow the passenger to hand “full control and responsibility to the 
vehicle…, without the need for the driver to intervene or monitor, for some, or all, of the 
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journey”.362 The English and the Scottish Law Commissions clarify that Government policy is 
that only vehicles which can achieve a minimal risk condition will be listed in the List of the 
AEV Act; in other words registered will be only the vehicles that are capable of coming to a 
safe stop, in the case of system failure.363 
Such autonomy is to be distinguished from vehicles where the driver “must monitor and remain 
ready to take control from the vehicle at all times”.364 The latter ones remain outside the scope 
of the Act and will be treated as conventional vehicles for liability and insurance purposes. The 
creation of this Registry aims to provide certainty to the insurance industry. Identifying the 
relevant vehicles by type will leave no doubts as to the type of compulsory insurance required.  
The Act does not refer to the AV taxonomy of SAE International when it comes to the 
Registry.365 Yet, it seems that the intent is to cover Levels 4 and 5 where the vehicle has control 
over the navigation and the human agent is either a passenger (setting the itinerary in Level 5) 
or takes over control in strictly pre-defined situations (Level 4)366. The inclusion of Level 4 
automation is evident from Section 2(a) of the Act which provides that the liability of insurers 
is triggered, when among other things, “an accident is caused by an automated vehicle when 
driving itself” which is further defined as “operating in a mode in which it is not being 
controlled, and does not need to be monitored, by an individual”.367 
The wording of this provision leaves the possibility open to cover Level 3 vehicles as they can 
perform all aspects of the driving task. Yet, it is unlikely that they will be included in the 
Registry, the reason being that insurers consider the risks associated with this level of 
automation too great to tolerate. 368 As such, the British insurance market has expressed a strong 
view about the insurability of Level 3 vehicles: “a way should be found to bypass Level 3 
where a driver does not need to monitor the dynamic driving conditions, nor the driving 
environment at all times, but must always be in a position to resume control”.369 Insurers are 
concerned that Level 3 vehicles will increase the level of accidents because drivers will either 
ignore the request to intervene or will not intervene quickly enough to manage the driving 
conditions. As Level 3 AV are already on the market370 the compromise achieved is to exclude 
them from the Registry and as such fall into the pre-existing fault-based liability regime.  
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4.4.2.2 Strict liability of insurers  
The core arrangement of the Act is to impose a system of strict liability on the insurers of AV. 
This is a remarkable feature under UK law, in which strict liability is treated as anomalous.371 
Section 2 provides that where damage to the driver, passenger or a third party is caused by an 
AV when driving itself, the insurer is liable for that damage, provided the vehicle was insured 
at the time of the accident.372 Once an insurer has settled a claim with the injured party it may 
then reclaim damages from other parties liable for the accident, e.g. the manufacturer of the 
vehicle.373 Hence, the AEV Act creates a wholly new form of liability which arises directly on 
insurers.374 
Considering the fault liability framework applicable to conventional cars,375 this provision 
brings quite a change to the legal landscape and brings English law closer to the continental 
European systems. The choice of strict liability is certainly a step to the right direction and 
reflects popular practice in regulating nascent activities. One of the basic benefits of the strict 
liability system is that it reduces the need for the claimant to delve into the way the new 
technology works in order to establish fault, an exercise that is both time-consuming and 
expensive. Such a choice was also made in the early days of aviation with a “presumed-fault” 
liability regime introduced in 1929.376  
In the context of the Act, claimants are required to prove that they suffered property damage 
or personal injury as a result of an accident caused by an AV. The Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission observe that where an accident is caused by a defect in the vehicle, 
the starting point is that the insured person (that is the driver or their employer) is liable for the 
accident. However, were the defect is latent and not discoverable by the exercise of reasonable 
care, it is open to the insured to show that they took all reasonable care in the circumstances.377 
For conventional vehicles, this is a high threshold: to escape liability, the defendant needs to 
show considerable evidence of the inspections and repairs carried out.378 Therefore, in practice, 
drivers’ insurers continue to pay claims where a vehicle defect may be the cause of an accident, 
mainly because it is so difficult to distinguish between driver fault and vehicle defects. 379 
The use of the term “accident” in Section 2 (1) (c) might prove problematic.380 What qualifies 
as “an unusual or unexpected event” can be used as a way of introducing a defence by inquiring 
into the nature of the vehicle’s behaviour. This might not be problematic for a claim by a third-
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party pedestrian who will be foreign to the vehicle’s operation. Yet, it might be raised in 
personal injury claims by the passengers of the AV following a collision. Did they suffer injury 
from an “accident”, if the AV did not malfunction or if they could have expected the reaction 
of the AV?  
This is similar to questions raised in claims by aircraft passengers who suffer damage to their 
genitals because they flush the aircraft toilet while sitting down. The toilet operates properly 
and the regulators require no relevant warnings. Is the injury caused by an “accident”, i.e. an 
unusual or unexpected event, considering that there was no malfunction of the aircraft and there 
was no obligation to have a written warning in the toilet? To avoid such hair-splitting questions 
that tend to delay the compensation process, a less complicated wording would have been 
advisable in Section 2(1), namely that “where death or personal injury is caused by an 
automated vehicle when driving itself and the vehicle is insured at that time, the insurer is liable 
for the damage”.  
The new Act does not make provision for accidents caused by uninsured owners of AV when 
they are driving themselves. It only provides that the uninsured owner is liable if the AV 
causing the damage is owned and under the control of several public bodies identified in 
Section 144(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, as well as vehicles in the public service of the 
Crown381. In the former case, it is expected that the Motor Insurance Bureau will pick up the 
bill, if the owner is not capable of paying out the claim. It has been rightly suggested that 
currently the Bureau cannot cover such damage, as there is no liability for the uninsured owner 
under the new Act.382 To fill this gap the British Government is at the time of writing in 
discussions with the Bureau.383  
 
4.4.2.3 Permitted exclusions of liability 
Reflecting the compulsory nature of third party insurance, Section 2(6) provides that “liability 
under this section may not be limited or excluded by a term of an insurance policy or in any 
other way ” except as provided in Section 4.384 Section 2(6) is wider than Section 148(2) of the 
Road Traffic Act which identifies the categories of “prohibited” terms.385 It has been noted that 
Section 2(6) streamlines all claims to insurers, creating, as such, two layers of victims: victims 
of conventional car accidents will “be seeking compensation under the Motor Insurance 
Bureau’s Arrangements and [victims of AV] under the insurance policy”.386  
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Section 4 permits insurers to exclude or limit their liability to the insured for damage directly 
resulting from “(a) software alterations made by the insured person, or with the insured 
person’s knowledge, that are prohibited under the policy, or (b) a failure to install safety-critical 
software updates that the insured person knows, or ought reasonably to know, are safety-
critical”387. In case the software alteration injures an insured person who is not the holder of 
the policy, such as a passenger, insurers will not be able to invoke the said section, unless the 
passenger knows that the software alterations are prohibited under the policy.388  
If insurers are required to pay compensation to a third party who is not insured under the policy 
for an injury caused by an accident that is the direct result of prohibited software alterations or 
failure to install safety-critical software updates, they can recover the amount from the 
insured.389 If insurers attempt to recover from an insured person who is not the holder of the 
policy for the said accident, they can only do so if the person in question knew that the software 
alterations were prohibited by the policy.390  
 
4.3.2.4. Contributory negligence 
The Act also makes provision for contributory negligence by clarifying that the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 is applicable.391 Considering that the insurers would not 
have actually contributed to the damage, the new Act makes “a quite difficult to follow” 
assumptions in ss 3(1) and 6(3): “first, that the claim is brought against someone other than the 
insurer, and secondly that the insurer is at fault because of the behaviour of the automated 
vehicle”392.  
As to the latter assumption, the provisions on contributory negligence have been criticized, 
because they might suggest that the courts should treat the issue as if a human driver had been 
involved, which could lead to inappropriate solutions under certain circumstances. The Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission mention an example in which a person cycling 
without lights at night is hit by an AV. They observe that while a human driver would have had 
difficulty in seeing the unlit cyclist, the failure to have lights might have very little effect on an 
automated vehicle equipped with LIDAR. The concern is that section 3(1) could be used to 
apply standards of human fault to quite different claims involving automated vehicles.393 This 
presents a difficult logic problem, as  the  appropriate  reduction would  depend i.a. on the 
degree of the at-fault driver's  negligence and possibly the  degree of the  product  defectiveness  
which  cannot  be specified under the AEV Act.394   
                                                 
387 Automated and Electric Vehicles Act, supra note 252, § 4 (1)(a) – (b). 
388 Id., § 4 (2). 
389 Id., § 4 (3) - (4). 
390 Id., § 4 (5). 
391 Id., § 3(1). 
392 Government Consultation, supra note 253, §§ 6.33- 6.36.   
393 Id., § 6.37. 
394 Oliphant, supra note 371, 195. 
59 
 
 
4.3.2.5 Rights of recourse 
Section 5 of the Act provides that the insurer or owner of the AV has, upon settling the amount 
of his liability with the injured party, a right of recourse against any party responsible for the 
accident, including the manufacturer of the AV.395 If the amount they recover for the 
responsible party exceeds the amount to be paid to the injured party, they are liable to the 
injured party for the excess.396 The government believes that it is not “in a manufacturer’s 
commercial interest to be unhelpful to insurers in determining liability or paying recovery 
claims; ultimately, insurers could potentially cease offering insurance products for the 
manufacturer’s vehicles if their route to recovery was consistently blocked”.397  
The assumption that the Government makes is correct, provided insurers remain on a 
commercial par to manufacturers. As often happens, this is not always the case. It has been 
witnessed that manufacturers tend to absorb the cost of accidents in nascent industries to 
promote its development. However, they become protective of their products by means of one-
sided indemnity clauses, once the products become established and their liabilities increase. 398 
Whether a similar development will take place in the case of AV will very much depend on the 
competitiveness of the manufacturers’ market and the insurance role of manufacturers. 
 
4.4.3. Evaluation 
The Act constitutes a step to the right direction, yet it is not as ground-breaking as it has been 
hailed.  
We question the legislative choice to impose strict liability only when the accident is caused 
by an automated vehicle “driving itself”, i.e. when it is not being controlled, and does not need 
to be monitored, by an individual”.399 In principle, the division follows the philosophy behind 
the drafting of the Act, namely to impose a strict liability regime only when the accident results 
from the malfunction of the AV. As such, the aim is to create a dividing line between human 
and technological errors with the former falling into the pre-existing fault-based liability 
system.  
This is feasible in Level 5 where it is expected that the passenger will undertake no driving or 
monitoring tasks. In that respect, the dividing line would be clearly drawn as there will be no 
interference from the passenger. Yet, there will be situations in Level 4 where the driver is 
requested to either take control or closely monitor the automatic driving. Section 2 provides 
that death or bodily injury caused by the AV during this period will be determined by the pre-
existing fault system. This way the Act limits the scope of Section 1, since the strict liability 
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regime does not apply to the entirety of cars listed in the Registry, but only while they are self-
driving as defined in the Act.  
This is a rather significant restriction of the scope of the Act that puts third-party victims in a 
disadvantageous position as their recovery depends on the mode of operation at the time of the 
accident - a rather fortuitous occurrence from their standpoint. It is expected that the monitoring 
requirement will slow down the recovery process, as it will become essential to identify the 
exact moment that monitoring was not required any more.  
This way, the Act puts the risk of monitoring on the third-party claimants rather than the 
insurers. A clear-cut solution would have been for the cars registered in the scheme of Section 
1 to be covered by strict liability in any situation other than being driven by passenger human 
driver. In the alternative, the fault liability regime could have been applicable solely to claims 
filled by the driver for personal injury caused while operating the car. This alternative would 
leave third party claims in the strict liability regime irrespective of the mode of operation of 
the vehicle (automatic or manual, monitored or not).  
The ingredients for the former alternative are already in the Act. Section 3(2) provides that 
insurers are not liable to the person in charge of the vehicle “where the accident that it caused 
was wholly due to the person’s negligence in allowing the vehicle to begin driving itself when 
it was not appropriate to do so”.400 This provision limits the scope of application of the 
contributory negligence provision of the Act by exonerating the insurers from liability when 
the accident is caused by the car being in self-driving mode in breach of the manufacturer’s 
guidelines or the prevailing driving conditions. Yet, it can be used to create a clearer dividing 
line between third party claims (always under strict liability) and human errors of the person in 
charge of the vehicle (fault-based liability).  
The Act focuses on the behaviour of the driver rather than the capabilities of the car. Having a 
car registered in the scheme of Section 1 will not automatically trigger the application of strict 
liability, but instead the applicable legal regime will be determined by reference to the mode 
of operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident. As such, the Act seems to be mostly 
relevant for Level 5 vehicles where there will be limited, if any, human interference in its 
operation. In all other vehicles, the strict liability regime will only come into force when the 
conditions permit the vehicle to be on unmonitored, self-driving mode. While this is reasonable 
in terms of claims filled by the driver, it is debatable whether the same regime should be 
applicable to third party claims as the accident will be caused by a failure in the interaction 
between the machine and the driver.  
In that respect, the Act is a step to the right direction, albeit a small one. Its drafters intended 
to limit the application of strict liability to technological malfunctions, leaving behavioural 
mishaps to be determined by reference to fault liability. Such a policy decision appropriate as 
it is for Level 5 automation, it has the potential to increase litigation costs for third party claims 
involving Level 4 vehicles which permit manual control.  
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This policy choice can be explained by the initial decision of the Government to include 
product liability in the scope of the Act. Initially, the Government suggested to “extend 
compulsory motor insurance to cover product liability to give motorists cover when they have 
handed full control over to the vehicle”.401 In essence, the Government suggested a system 
where liability cover would be in place during the manual operation and product liability cover 
during the autonomous operation. This proposal was rejected during the consultation 
process.402 At the same time, it can also be explained as a veiled attempt by the Government to 
dissuade any arguments supporting the generalised application of strict liability regime to 
motor vehicles.  
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the initial conclusion of the English and Scottish Law 
Commissions is that litigation over manufacturers’ or other suppliers’ liability will play a 
relatively limited role in compensating victims, setting standards or allocating blame for 
defective automated vehicles for three reasons:  
(1) The main avenue for providing compensation will be through insurers, under the 
provisions of Part 1 of AEV Act. Litigation against manufacturers will then be a 
commercial matter for the insurer;  
(2) The main means of setting standards will be through regulation. If the system passes 
relevant testing (and there is no impropriety by the manufacturer), it is unlikely that the 
courts would themselves seek to impose a different, more stringent standard.  
(3) The main means of allocating blame will be through the criminal justice system.  
The relatively low level of damages for deaths, coupled with the difficulties of obtaining 
aggravated or punitive damages, means that civil litigation will not be an important form of 
accountability.403 
The AEV Act is certainly not the end of the story for English law. We will have to wait for the 
recommendations of the Law Commission in 2021 as to the shape of the civil liability regime 
for AV.  
 
5. Third-party liability regimes in other European States 
The European Commission observes that, apart from national laws implementing the PLD, all 
EU MS attribute liability for damages caused by motor vehicles to the keeper or the driver of 
the vehicle. Liability can be fault-based, including cases where the fault of the keeper/driver is 
rebuttably presumed, or risk-based, where the keeper/driver is strictly liable for creating the 
risk associated with the operation of a motor vehicle on public streets.404 In some States, both 
categories of third-party liability regimes can exist, i.e. general fault-based tort liability rules 
                                                 
401 Government consultation, supra note 280, § 2.9. 
402 Id., §§ 3.8 – 3.10. 
403 Para. 6.115. 
404 See Commission Staff Working Document, Liability for emerging digital technologies, SWD (2018) 137 
final, 25 April 2018, available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/european-commission-staff-
working-document-liability-emerging-digital-technologies (last visited June 5, 2018), pp. 8 and 14, with 
indicative citations of national provisions. 
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and special strict liability rules on vehicle keeper or driver liability, similar to the German legal 
system. 
The generic nature of these rules, either broad (all torts) or narrow (all vehicles), indicates that 
they will be applicable to accidents involving AV. 
 
6. Evaluation of the legal landscape in Europe 
In Europe, third-party liability for AV is governed mainly by the PLD, as well as by general 
tort liability rules on defective products and traffic accidents. The full-harmonization character 
of the PLD creates a pre-emption of EU MS regarding the introduction of special product-
liability on AV. Nevertheless, in the absence of special rules, eventual legal lacunae are likely 
to be covered by the development of special case-law on AV accidents, which will interpret 
general tort rules on defective products in the light of the particularities of AV. 
The PLD seems adequate to cover AV cases, in general, yet there are grey areas, especially 
regarding the notion of ‘product’ and ‘defect’. National regimes on product liability and road 
traffic liability are diverse and comprise often a combination of regimes of fault liability and 
strict liability. Moreover, they may interact with special rules on product safety in a variety of 
ways, e.g. by determining the scope of negligence or by providing the legal basis for liability 
for breach of statutory duties. All these factors create legal uncertainty. 
Legislative initiatives on AV so far stem from countries with strong industries, i.e. Germany, 
one of the biggest world carmakers, and England, which hosts a huge insurance-services 
industry. The existence of such industries in the respective countries is a parameter of the 
regulatory solutions adopted in each country.405  
The UK has been very active in the development of AV technology, but, at the same time, is 
protective of its insurance industry, which is one of the main contributors to its economy. There 
is no doubt that insurers will have a major saying in the consultation recently opened on the 
liability system for AV. Its success will very much depend on their endorsement rather than 
the fine balancing of interests between the various parties involved, namely manufacturers, 
users, insurers as well as third parties. 
The decision of the UK Government to produce an Act that moves to a system of strict liability 
is certainly a step to the right direction and it might be indicative of the direction that the 
liability system currently under consultation might take. Yet it is not as ground-breaking as it 
has been hailed. It is arguable that a clearer solution would have been for strict liability to be 
imposed for any accidents to third parties caused by the vehicles registered in the scheme of 
Section 1, irrespective of the mode of operation. Considering the provision on contributory 
negligence, such an arrangement would provide full protection to third parties from the 
malfunction of the vehicle and/or the negligence of the driver, while the insurers would be able 
                                                 
405 The German government has explicitly stated as a policy objective the promotion of the German car industry 
see Bundesregierung [Federal Government], supra note 143, 12-13. 
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to defend claims based on the pedestrian’s behaviour. At the same time, we believe that rights 
of recourse shall not be left to market forces but be regulated in a manner that create a level-
playing field between insurers and manufacturers.  
 
7. A brief overview of the law in the US 
US Federal policy on AV is laid down mainly in two policy documents of the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the United States Department of 
Transportation.406 It aims to promote innovation and facilitate the testing, introduction and use 
of Automatic Driving Systems, as well as to improve roadway safety. The guiding principles 
of the US policy are, among others, to prioritize safety, remain technology neutral, modernize 
regulations and encourage a consistent regulatory environment.407 
While the Federal Government is responsible for regulating the safety performance of vehicles 
and vehicle equipment, as well as their commercial operation in interstate commerce, States 
and local governments are responsible for licensing drivers, establishing rules of the road, and 
formulating policy in tort liability and insurance.408 Thus, tort liability and related insurance 
issues for road traffic accidents are determined mainly by state laws. 
The investigation reports of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) on the fatal 
accidents of Tesla in Florida and Uber in Arizona are particularly enlightening  as they provide 
a first glance of how liability rules may be applicable to AV accidents. 
In the former case, a Tesla Model S 70D car, traveling eastbound on US Highway 27A (US-
27A), struck a refrigerated semitrailer powered by a Freightliner Cascadia truck-tractor. At the 
time of the collision, the truck was making a left turn from westbound US-27A across the two 
eastbound travel lanes onto a local paved road. The car struck the right side of the semitrailer, 
crossed underneath it, and then went off the right roadside at a shallow angle. The impact with 
the underside of the semitrailer sheared off the roof of the car. The NTSB report concluded that 
the probable cause of the crash was the truck driver’s failure to yield the right of way to the 
car, combined with the car driver’s inattention due to overreliance on vehicle automation, 
which resulted in the car driver’s lack of reaction to the presence of the truck.409  
In the latter case, an SUV test vehicle, modified with an Automated Driving System and with 
a human operator at the driver’s seat for emergency cases, hit a pedestrian, who walked on the 
road pushing her bicycle. The NTSB found that the probable cause of the accident was the 
                                                 
406 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (NHTSA), UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 2.0: A VISION FOR SAFETY (2017), 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a_tag.pdf (Nov. 27, 
2019); Id., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION: AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3.0, Oct. 4, 2018, 
https://www.transportation.gov/av/3 (Nov. 27, 2019). 
407 Automated vehicles 3.0, supra note 406, iv-v. 
408 Id., at 5.   
409 NTSB, Collision Between a Car Operating With Automated Vehicle Control Systems and a Tractor-
Semitrailer Truck Near Williston, Florida May 7, 2016, Accident Report NTSB/HAR-17/02 PB2017-102600, 
Sept. 12, 2017, at 1-2 and 42, https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59989/609449.pdf (Nov. 26, 2019). 
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failure of the vehicle operator to monitor the driving environment and the operation of the 
automated driving system because she was visually distracted throughout the trip by her cell 
phone.410 
We will attempt to briefly present the main tendencies that seem to exist in the US, with 
reference also to the above-mentioned accident investigation reports. We conclude this part 
with a comparison between the US and EU law. 
 
7.1 Liability for AV in the US 
Third-party liability for AV could be based on product liability or on road traffic negligence. 
Motor insurance issues play also a major role.  
 
7.1.1 Product liability 
There is no uniform federal legislation enacted on product liability. Nevertheless, to encourage 
approximation among state laws,  the US Department of Commerce has published a Model 
Uniform Products Liability Act (MUPLA),411  while the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) has also adopted model legislation that has influenced some states in the 
codification of their product liability laws.412 Thus, the exact requirements for establishing 
liability vary from state to state, yet some states have created statutory causes of action which 
replace traditional common-law theories.413 
 
7.1.1.1 Product liability theories 
There are two main legal bases or theories for extra-contractual product liability claims in the 
US: negligence and strict liability.  
Negligence is unreasonable conduct, as measured against the  conduct  of  a  reasonable  prudent  
manufacturer  in  the  same  or  similar circumstances.414 Reasonable care is established by 
reference to the risks arising from the use of the product, balancing the costs of improving 
safety against the foreseeable safety benefits by such improvement.415 Proving negligence, 
especially for manufacturing defects, is often challenging, which makes negligence not widely 
used anymore. However, at least in manufacturing defects, courts often allow juries to infer 
                                                 
410 NTSB, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and  
Pedestrian Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018, HWY18MH010, at 1 and 4, 
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Documents/2019-HWY18MH010-BMG-abstract.pdf (Nov. 26, 2019). 
411 MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (1979). 
412 Product Liability Act, ALEC https://www.alec.org/model-policy/product-liability-act/ (Dec. 2, 2019) 
413 Sean P. Wajert, Product Liability Claims, Defenses, and Remedies, Westlaw Practical Law, Practice Note, at  
*6. 
414 David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C.L.Rev. 851, 861 (2002). 
415 Id. 
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negligence from the existence of the defect.416 Negligence can be mainly used to found claims 
for post-sale failure to warn or to recall.417  
 
Strict product liability is the dominant theory for personal injury claims against 
manufacturers.418 The majority of US case law on strict liability follows the formulation of 
§402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which reads: 
“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if  
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller.” 
The Restatement (Third) on Product Liability has adopted a simpler formulation: “One engaged 
in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective 
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.” 
 
7.1.1.2 ‘Defect’ 
There are three types of defect: manufacturing defects, design defects and marketing defects.419 
In the automotive sector there is also the doctrine of crashworthiness.  
A manufacturing defect exists when the product departs from its intended design and 
specifications, owing to errors in the production procedure.420 According to the Restatement 
(Third) on Product Liability, a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product 
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation 
and marketing of the product.421 
                                                 
416 Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB.§ 3 (AM. LAW INST.1998): “It may be inferred 
that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, 
without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: (a) was of a kind that ordinarily 
occurs as a result of product defect; and (b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other than 
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution. 
417 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 10 and 11 (AM. LAW INST.1998). 
418 Kevin  Funkhouser,  Paving  the  Road  Ahead:  Autonomous  Vehicles,  Products Liability and the Need for 
a New Approach, 2013  UTAH  L.  Rev. 437, 445 (2013); David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 291, 
293 (2008). 
419 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST.1998). 
420 Owen, Manufacturing Defects, supra note 414, 852. 
421 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST.1998). 
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A design defect is related to the product’s design concept, which predetermines the extent to 
which the use of the product will result in injury to the user.422 Courts have used mainly two 
tests to determine the existence of a design defect: (a) the consumer expectations test, i.e. 
whether the product design meets the safety expectations of the users; (b) the risk-utility test, 
i.e. whether the safety benefits of an alternative safer design outweigh the resulting costs.423 
However, the latter has become the standard test for examining potential design defects,424 and 
has been used also in the Restatement (Third) on Product Liability, according to which there is 
a defect in design, when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other 
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.425 
A product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings, when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of 
reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the 
product not reasonably safe.426  
According to the doctrine of crashworthiness, the foreseeable use of automobiles includes 
being involved in accidents; hence, a reasonably safe vehicle should not aggravate the injuries 
sustained by the driver or the passengers as a result of the primary impact.427 In other words, a 
vehicle should be reasonably safe to occupy even in collision impacts. Such defect in the 
vehicle’s design or construction makes the manufacturer liable for that portion of the damage 
or injury caused by the defect over and above the damage or injury that would probably have 
resulted from the impact or collision absent the defect.428 The crashworthiness doctrine has 
been applied by many courts involving all types of defects.429 It has also been included in the 
Restatement (Third) on Product Liability as “increased harm due to product defect”.430 
In the context of AV, the NTSB reports on the Tesla and Uber accidents provide interesting 
clues as to what could be considered a design defect. In the Tesla accident, the NTSB 
recommended to manufacturers of L.2 automation vehicles to incorporate  system  safeguards  
that  limit  the  use  of  automated control systems to those conditions for which they were 
designed, and to develop applications that effectively sense the driver’s level of engagement 
and alert the driver when engagement is lacking.431 In the Uber accident, the NTSB 
recommended that, for test vehicles, ADS functional limitations that create safety risks should 
                                                 
422 Owen, Design Defects, supra note 418, 291. 
423 Id., 299. 
424 Id., 307, 309. 
425 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST.1998). 
426 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
427 Larsen v General Motors Corporation, 391 F.2d 495, paras 33-34 (8th Cir. 1968). 
428 Id, paras 35-36. 
429 R. Ben Hogan, The Crashworthiness Doctrine, 18 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 37, 42 (1994). 
430 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
431 NTSB, supra note 409, at 43-44.  
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be mitigated through a safety management system that, at a minimum, includes safety policy, 
safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion.432 
Concerning potentially inadequate instructions or warnings, it is noteworthy that two consumer 
advocacy groups, the Centre for Auto Safety433 and the Consumer Watchdog434 have sent a 
letter to the Federal Trade Commission and the California Department of Motor Vehicles 
alleging that Tesla’s advertising, statements and marketing materials are misleading, as they 
give the impression that its Autopilot system is far more capable than it currently is. 
 
7.1.1.3 Recoverable damages 
There are four types of damages recoverable in product liability cases: (a) compensatory 
damages, (b) pain and suffering endured as a result of the injury, (c) loss of consortium to 
compensate for the effect the injury had on a marital relationship and (d) punitive damages, if 
the defendants' conduct was egregious.435  
The US Supreme Court has established a triple test to determine whether an award of punitive 
damages violates the constitutional due process requirements: (1) the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct, (2) the ratio of punitive damages to actual harm, and (3) the size of the 
award vis-à-vis the statutory sanctions for comparable misconduct.436 As to the first criterion, 
the US Supreme Court has ruled that a court must consider whether: the harm was physical 
rather than economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of 
the health or safety of others; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; 
and the harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.437 
Regarding the ratio of punitive damages to actual harm, the Court has been reluctant to identify 
concrete constitutional limits; however, it has stated that, in practice, few awards exceeding a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will satisfy due process,438 
while awards exceeding a 4:1 ratio will be very close to unconstitutionality.439 Besides, many 
jurisdictions restrict the amount of awardable punitive damages.440 
                                                 
432 NTSB, supra note 410, at 5. 
433 The letter, dated May 23, 2018, is available at https://www.consumerwatchdog.org/sites/default/files/2019-
07/CWD%20and%20CAS%20Tesla%20Autopilot%20Letter%20to%20DMV%202019.pdf (Nov. 27, 2019). 
434 The letter, dated July 25, 2019, is available at https://www.consumerwatchdog.org/sites/default/files/2019-
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435 See Fundamentals of Product Liability Law, LEXIS HUB https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/lexis-
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7.1.1.4 Liable parties 
Liable could be the manufacturer of the end product, the component manufacturer, persons in 
the supply chain of the product (sellers, resellers, wholesalers, distributors) and/or anyone who 
repaired or modified the product.441  
 
7.1.2 Road traffic liability 
Road traffic liability is based on negligence whose exact elements may differ from state to 
state.442  
The use of motor vehicles is regulated in many states by statute and some courts find that 
violation of such statutes creates a presumption of negligence, negligence per se or a reversal 
of the burden of proof.443 The driver is under a duty to exercise due care, including keeping the 
vehicle under reasonable control at all times, maintain a proper lookout for any risks, and avoid 
collision or contact with other vehicles, pedestrians and persons properly using the highway.444 
Maintaining the vehicle in proper and safe condition, including the proper functioning of its 
safety equipment is also an important factor in determining negligence, often influenced by 
statutory requirements.445 A duty of care is owed also to passengers or guests of the vehicle, 
although some state guest statutes still require that the driver must have been gross negligent 
or reckless to incur liability.446 
In the context of automating driving, the NTSB report on the Tesla accident in Florida 
concluded that, among others, the driver was inattentive and over-relied on vehicle 
automation.447 In the Uber accident in Arizona, the NTSB report concluded that the driver 
failed to monitor the driving environment and the operation of the ADS.448 Thus, in liability 
terms, in both cases the human drivers of the vehicle operated in automation mode seem to 
have violated their duty to a proper lookout. 
 
7.2 Motor vehicle insurance 
Motor vehicles insurance is regulated at state level and is not uniform across states. State 
legislation provides for minimum insurance limits for vehicle owners regarding death and 
                                                 
441Fundamentals of Product Liability Law, supra note 435. 
442 See an overview of each state’s requirements for establishing negligence at 
https://statelaws.findlaw.com/accident-and-injury-laws/negligence-laws.html (Nov. 26, 2019). 
443 2A American Law of Torts § 9:36, Westlaw (database updated March 2019) at *3. 
444 Id., at *3 and *9. 
445 Id., at *6. 
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448 Supra note 410. 
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bodily injury, and property damage insurance for injuries and damage caused to third parties.449 
In some states additional coverage is required, which may include personal injury protection, 
uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured motorist coverage.450 
Personal injury protection or no-fault insurance covers the vehicle driver as well as persons 
both within the vehicle (passengers) and outside of it (e.g. pedestrians, cyclists) regardless of 
who is at fault or negligent.451 Uninsured motorist coverage covers cases of accidents caused 
by an uninsured vehicle or a hit-and-run motorist.452 Underinsured coverage applies to 
accidents in which insurance policy limits of the at-fault vehicle are lower than the damage 
actually suffered.453 
Regarding AV, traditional car-insurance coverage is not expected to be significantly affected 
in low automation levels (up to L.3), since there will be a driver in charge of the vehicle 
operation.454 However, in high automation levels (L.4-5) liability is expected to shift to the 
manufacturer with the corresponding changes in insurance coverage.455  
In any case, some states have already established minimum insurance coverage for AV and 
more are expected to follow.456 
 
7.3 The role of NHTSA 
                                                 
449 See on the insurance requirements of each state Automobile Financial Responsibility Laws By State, 
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE https://www.iii.org/automobile-financial-responsibility-laws-by-state, July 
2018 (last visited Nov. 25, 2019); Digest of Motor Laws, Liability Laws, AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE ASSOCIATION 
https://drivinglaws.aaa.com/tag/liability-laws/ (Nov. 25, 2019); Minimum liability car insurance requirements 
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The NHTSA is responsible for issuing technical safety standards and ensuring conformity 
therewith.457  
Compliance with the Federal safety standard does not automatically exempt any person from 
liability at common law, including tort liability for harm caused by negligent conduct, except 
where preemption may apply.458 Nevertheless, failure to comply could trigger the 
manufacturer’s liability, especially regarding mandatory safety features,459 and may even bring 
about the award of punitive damages.460 As to preemption, the US Supreme Court has ruled 
that the federal standard would supersede, if the effect of a State law tort claim would be to 
impose a performance standard on a motor vehicle or equipment manufacturer that is 
inconsistent with the federal standard.461 
 
7.4 Proposals for reform 
Many doctrinal writings have criticized the current liability system as inadequate and 
inappropriate for AV. The current product liability system is seen as inadequate because 
technological features of AV may be unable or highly impractical to fit into existing product 
liability concepts.462 Moreover, the current strict liability system is regarded as inappropriate, 
because increased automation and shift of liability to manufacturers are predicted to place  too 
heavy a burden on manufacturers, hamper innovation and significantly delay the introduction 
of new technologies that have the potential to dramatically increase safety.463 Besides, varying 
state laws on liability and insurance are unhelpful for manufacturers, who are subject to 
different regimes and potentially conflicting judgments, increasing considerably their cost.464 
As a result, there have been numerous proposals for reform, some of which we outline 
indicatively below. 
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One proposal favors the development and application of a "reasonable algorithm" standard 
applicable to non-human decision makers, such as AV, similar to the "reasonable person" or 
"reasonable professional" standard that applies to human tortfeasors.465   
It has also been submitted that liability of AV owners should be modeled to liability of canine 
owners, because both dogs and AV may act independently from their human owners and inflict 
damage.466 
In addition, a strict-liability system has been proposed for damage and injury caused by AV 
not attributable to a design or manufacturer defect, which could impose a court-compelled 
insurance regime.467 Such system could be financed by either the end and component 
manufacturers in some sort of enterprise liability, or by the AV themselves after being vested 
with legal personality.468 
The proposal to establish a federal non-fault insurance scheme, funded by the contributions of 
vehicle drivers has also been put forward.469 Such scheme would practically eliminate all 
claims based on manufacturing and design defects; however, it should maintain claims based 
on crashworthiness, to incentivize manufacturers to build safer vehicles.470 
Another insurance-based proposal is the creation of a federal fund at the example of nuclear 
energy insurance.471 Such fund would be based on two-tier liability: in the first tier, there will 
be limited liability; in the second tier, the indemnification costs would be covered through 
annual contributions of each manufacturer to the fund, by analogy to its production volume, 
predicted revenue and predicted amount of risk.472  
Other authors suggest the creation of a special Manufacture Enterprise Liability regime (MER) 
for accidents caused by L.4 and L.5 vehicles. This would be a manufacturer-financed, strict-
responsibility compensation system for bodily injury, administered by a fund created through 
assessments levied on HAV manufacturers.473  
According to another proposal, the appropriate solution would be to coordinate state tort law 
with federal safety regulations. Federal regulations could prescribe to manufacturers to (i) 
subject the vehicles to adequate pre-marketing testing and post-sale updates, and (ii) warn users 
about inherent risks that could lead to a crash. State tort law could then enforce such regulatory 
duties.474 
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There seems to be wide support for a uniform system of liability and/or insurance across the 
US, as it would create legal certainty for manufacturers and insurers and facilitate deployment 
of new technologies.475 As external observers, we recognize that uniform rules would be very 
helpful. However, the lack of such rules regarding conventional vehicles does not seem to have 
created adverse conditions. AV incorporate advanced technology, but they remain an advanced 
variant of existing transportation modes. Interstate commerce and transportation has been 
going on relatively smoothly for many decades despite the legal fragmentation. Such 
fragmentation may create difficulties to the industry, which, however, do not appear 
insurmountable – if they were, there would have been market pressure strong enough to 
instigate federal legislative action. One could object to such thoughts, claiming that accidents 
involving conventional vehicles are due overwhelmingly to driver error, whereas AV are 
expected to shift liability to the manufacturer. Still, manufacturer liability has not brought about 
uniform liability rules even in other domains, in which it is more likely to occur.  
It should also be considered that the gradual introduction of automated driving systems is 
expected, which means that public roads will be shared among conventional vehicles and 
automated vehicles of various automation degrees.476 Such mixture of conventional and 
automated vehicles may vary from state to state, wit different states experiencing different 
levels of mixed traffic. Besides, states have been traditionally regulating liability and insurance 
issues and are not likely to welcome any transfer of responsibilities to the federal government. 
Thus, uniform liability and insurance rules on AV may be impractical, and even politically 
intolerable from their perspective. 
In our view, the US experience shows the importance of uniform technical standards, which 
can influence liability and insurance rules in a variety of ways. The expected user and 
manufacturer behavior often refers, directly or indirectly, to such standards - e.g. for 
manufacturers a violation of safety standards could create a presumption or even establish a 
breach of duty of care, or indicate a defective safety design, whereas insurance coverage may 
be unavailable if the accident was due to violation of such standards. Therefore, common safety 
standards might prove more useful than uniform liability and insurance rules.   
 
7.5 Comparison of US and European legal systems 
Both the US and EU legal rules on AV present elements of fragmentation and coherence at 
different levels.  
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In the US there is a federal policy on AV, despite leaving many implementation aspects to the 
states. In the EU there is no clear and specific policy on AV regulation: AV are considered a 
special aspect of more generic AI issues. This has given the opportunity to individual European 
States to establish their own AV policy. 
Liability and insurance issues regarding AV are determined at state level in the US. At the same 
time, the federal government has competency only for safety standards, which may influence 
the application of state rules on liability and insurance. In the EU, there are uniform rules on 
product safety, strict product liability and motor-vehicle insurance, while each State lays down 
its own rules on negligence product liability and road traffic liability.  
Regarding product liability rules, they can be strict or negligence-based both in the US and in 
the EU. In the US, strict product liability is mainly determined according to the risk-utility test. 
In the EU the PLD has focused on the consumer-expectations test, although national courts 
sometimes consider also risk-utility aspects. Negligence product liability is applied without 
major differences on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, both US and European courts may 
alleviate claimants’ burden of proof through inferences. However, punitive damages are either 
prohibited or rarely awarded in Europe. 
Contrary to US legal practice, road traffic liability in European states can be unlimited and 
negligence based, or strict and limited, while non-fault insurance is not used. Nevertheless, 
both legal systems provide for uninsured vehicle insurance. 
Noteworthy is also that in both legal systems the limited attempts to regulate liability and 
insurance of AV have focused on road traffic liability, not on product liability. Regulators on 
both sides of the Atlantic seem to be opting for the traditional dispute-settlement mechanisms 
of road traffic – at least until the industry proceeds with high-level automated vehicles. So far, 
regulators are leaving innovation to the industry – they are not interested in innovating 
themselves.  
Last but not least, the US does not seem to worry too much about the international-law aspects 
of road traffic.  Being a party only to the 1949 Geneva Convention and not to the 1968 Vienna 
Convention, while only the latter allows driving with hands off the wheel, means that US 
national legislation may not be living up to US duties under international law.   
As a result, although the EU is no federal State, the legal landscape in the EU is in some aspects 
more uniform compared to the US. However, under both systems there seems to be a limited 
appetite for new liability and insurance rules, before high-level automation technologies have 
been developed enough to be massively deployed. 
 
8. Considerations de lege ferenda 
 
8.1 Need for clarity 
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Perhaps the most important issue in liability for AV is clarity both with respect to third-party 
compensation and redress actions. 
First of all, we need to clarify the primary liable person. It would be very useful to channel 
liability to a single person or entity, i.e. the driver or the manufacturer, who could then take 
redress against other potentially liable parties. We consider it more appropriate to establish 
strict liability of the driver, whose insurer would settle the claims of third parties. There will 
be vehicles of various levels of automation on the roads for many years to come, while road 
traffic insurers have already extensive know-how in such claims. Therefore, it would be much 
simpler for third parties to turn against these insurers than having to determine the appropriate 
liable person by examining whether the vehicle was being driven in automated mode and 
whether the human or the ADS was responsible for the accident.  
Second, we need clarity of concepts. A clear definition of the ‘automated vehicle’ is necessary, 
i.e. when a vehicle should be considered to operate in automated mode. Under the PLD, 
especially the concepts of ‘product’ and ‘defect’ create significant problems when applied to 
AV. A ‘product’ should also include software, even if it is not incorporated in a physical 
medium. This would cover suppliers of defective over-the-air updates, which could cause 
damage to third parties. As to ‘defects’, violation of traffic rules should qualify as such. Learned 
behaviour of the AV that causes an accident could be regarded as a defect that existed when 
the product was put into circulation. Nevertheless, it has been correctly observed that self-
learning algorithms might cause damage regardless of any defect as they rely on probability-
based predictions, and probabilities by nature get it wrong some of the time.477 
Third, we need situational clarity during the operation of the AV.478 The vehicle should indicate 
whether it is operating in automated mode, the health of its systems, whether it is unable to 
continue operating in automated mode because of a system failure or because it is outside its 
ODD, whether the human driver is required to intervene and what is expected to do, as well as 
confirmation of handing over control to the human driver. 
Fourth, clarity as to the reconstruction of the accident is necessary. Event Data Recorders 
should be mandatory equipment in any AV and should be capable of collecting all necessary 
evidence in case of an accident: space-time coordinates of the vehicle, mode of operation, 
speed, direction, health of the system, request to the driver to intervene or activation of the 
automated mode, confirmation of handing over control to the human or the ADS.479 Moreover, 
the storage period of the EDR data should be clearly provided in the law, as well as the persons 
who have access to the data. Since all these provisions should conform to the applicable data 
protection rules, especially the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),480 official 
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guidance documents regarding the relation of such provisions with personal data protection 
would be useful.  
 
8.2 AV and Ethics 
Ethics is an important factor in AV regulation and in AI in general. It is not accidental that 
ethics reports commissioned by official institutions have preceded new pieces of legislation in 
AV in Europe.481 Ethics considerations provide guidance as to what would be the desirable, or 
at least acceptable, content of regulation in a specific jurisdiction. As ethics concepts vary 
among societies, there are no universally agreed ethical principles.482 Nonetheless, it might be 
possible to discern some common principles in Europe.  
Deployment of AV requires that they achieve a minimum level of safety, which exceeds that 
of human drivers. AI systems should produce safety gains, not exacerbate harm to humans.483 
The decision-making process of ADS should be transparent and explicable. Full technical 
transparency may not be possible, at least for the time being, owing to the high complexity of 
some AI systems.484 Nevertheless, a certain degree of explainability of decisions of the ADS, 
i.e. to supply the rationale behind the decision, is considered necessary.485 
In case of unavoidable accidents, no distinction is allowed based on personal features, such as 
gender, age, etc, neither is permitted to offset victims against one another.486 Such behavior 
would violate the respect of human dignity, which should be at all times observed when 
deploying AI.487 
 
8.3 Special risks of AV and insurability 
AV present no particularities as to their disaster potential compared with ordinary vehicles. 
They operate in a different mode, yet their potential for personal injuries and property damages 
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do not differ from those of ordinary cars. An AV, even in case of unlawful interference with 
its operation, could cause no greater damage than an ordinary car. Thus, from an insurance 
perspective the probable maximum loss remains unchanged.  
In this regard, the AV industry is different than the nuclear-energy industry as well as the 
shipping and aviation industries. These activities have catastrophic potential, which is hard to 
quantify and call for a liability cap to be rendered insurable. The nuclear accidents in 
Chernobyl488 and Fukushima489 , as well as the oil-spill cases of Deep Horizon490 and Exxon 
Valdez491 have demonstrated their immense disaster potential in terms of public health and 
environmental damages. Moreover, the 9/11 attacks have demonstrated the enormous 
insurance risks arising from the deliberate misuse of aviation.492 Nonetheless, even the most 
extreme cases of terrorists using cars as weapons493 are dwarfed by the above-mentioned cases.  
What is special about AV is the shift of liability from the driver/owner to the manufacturer, 
which increases the manufacturer’s exposure to liability. However, such risk is temporary and 
inherent in all new technologies, until they mature. An associated parameter relates to the 
potential disruption of the traditional insurance market, in the sense that manufacturers may 
opt to establish their own insurance companies, to cover their risks. Nevertheless, as long as 
the risk remains insurable, the potential re-organization of the insurance market should be of 
no concern to the legislator of a market economy.  
Thus, the disaster potential of AV does not justify an amendment of the current liability status 
through a special liability cap. 
 
8.4 AV, strict liability and media  
States have a variety of ways to regulate liability resulting from road accidents, which makes 
the creation of a unified regime for liability resulting from the use of AV difficult, if not 
impossible. However, we have reached a point in the development of AV where a policy 
decision on the liability framework governing their operations shall be made. This issue 
becomes even more topical for jurisdictions that use a fault-based liability system for injuries 
caused by conventional vehicles.  
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We believe that strict liability of the manufacturers shall be the framework of choice for the 
following two reasons. Firstly, a fault-based system would put on third parties injured by AV 
the additional (expensive) burden of understanding an evolving new technology and explaining 
what went wrong with it. Such a burden puts them in a disadvantageous position towards 
victims of conventional vehicles and allocates the cost of technological development on them 
rather than the risk creator or user of the AV. On the contrary, a system of strict liability would 
channel the cost of accidents to the risk creators and motivate them to improve the safety levels 
of AV. Judging from the level of investment in the development of AV, we believe that the 
industry does not require a liability subsidy granted by third party victims.  
Secondly, the allocation of the risk of accidents to third parties is a policy decision that has the 
potential to slow down the deployment of AV. This is so because AV accidents are a first-rate 
opportunity for media to construct a dramatic version of reality by simplifying technical 
information and amplifying liability issues.494 Creating a liability system that does not provide 
full protection to third parties suffering personal injuries from the malfunctions of AV will only 
fuel a (false) perception of AV manufacturers as greedy profiteers who cut corners on safety 
and liability regulation for profit.495  
At the same time, strict liability will provide for a liability system that assists the public image 
of AV. Aviation insurers realised in the 80s and 90s that taking a strict approach to the 
settlement of (some well-publicised) claims while improving the industry’s public image is an 
impossible task.496 The end result was for insurers to support a liability scheme that was 
designed to facilitate the quick settlement of disputes via a system of strict and unlimited 
liability.497  
Currently in the EU such strict liability is already in force through the PLD. The PLD is under 
review, to adjust its provisions to the necessities of the AI application. Its full-harmonization 
character entails that EU MS may not proceed to own legislative initiatives.  
 
8.5 AV and benefits for society  
AV promise to make roads much safer, reduce congestion and enhance environmental 
protection.498 However, the use of AV is not going to revolutionize people’s lives, as other 
technological advances did. For example, aviation reduced dramatically travel time in long 
distances, enabling people to travel to any place of the world within hours rather than within 
months, as was previously the case. Nuclear energy enabled production of great amounts of 
environmental friendly energy, compared to fossil fuels, at low operational cost. Even ordinary 
automotive vehicles changed radically people’s lives, by reducing distances and contributing 
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to the formation of modern big cities. On the contrary, AV are the next step of an already 
existing technology. It brings significant advantages to our way of living, yet it is not the 
breakthrough that advertisements often portray it to be.  
Consequently, there is no justification for affording special liability protection to AV owners 
or manufacturers.  
 
8.6 Human factors 
In allocating liability between the driver and the manufacturer, it is important to take human 
factors into account. They are important in establishing the liability of both the driver for 
negligence and the manufacturer for design defects and failure to warn.  
A series of studies have identified the following human factors involved in automated 
driving:499  
The driver’s behaviour changes according to the level of automation engaged. For example, 
highly automated driving (HAD), which automates both longitudinal 
(acceleration/deceleration) and lateral motion (steering), has been found to be markedly 
different than Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), which automates only longitudinal motion. This 
is so because the driver of a highly automated car has the possibility to divert attention to 
secondary tasks, whereas an ACC driver still has to attend to the roadway.500 
Drivers in HAD conditions respond slower to safety-critical events, especially when they are 
engaged in non-driving tasks, such as reading or watching a movie.501 Regarding non-critical 
tasks, the reaction time of the driver to take-over requests from the system was about 10 
seconds, although shorter reaction times are possible.502 However, it has been shown that 
resuming control of the vehicle fully and effectively requires 30-40 seconds.503 In addition, the 
request from the system to the driver to engage the manual mode must be both visual and 
audible to be effective.504 
Drivers of AV may benefit from systems and mechanisms which provide assistance not only 
after the take-over request by the automated system, but also specifically for the time period 
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shortly after the driver has deactivated the automation. Such assistance could have the form of 
emergency braking and lane departure warning, keeping a minimum distance to the lead 
vehicle and preventing lane changes when other vehicles are in the adjacent lanes.505 
Moreover, drivers of vehicles in highly automated modes tend to demonstrate overreliance on 
their vehicle,506 which has been confirmed by both the Tesla and the Uber accidents,507 as well 
as by a recent incidence.508 At the same time protracted HAD appears to be tedious, reduce 
situation awareness and intensify driver drowsiness, exclusively in light traffic.509 Monitoring 
the roadway for potential hazards during HAD induces mental workload and stress, because 
the driver undertakes a passive role and must supervise the activity of imperfect automation,510 
and results in gradual fall of vigilance and performance.511 Humans are not good at monitoring 
automated tasks for prolonged time.512 Manufacturers that require drivers to remain vigilant 
for extended periods create an impossible task, in which humans are bound to fail.513 
In this regard, the introductory information on the use of AV that manufacturers provide to 
drivers is crucial. A focus on the automated driving system's competence without an 
appropriate elaboration of its limitations might lead to misplaced trust.514   
The above-mentioned findings are not conclusive and behavioural studies underline the need 
for further research.515 Nevertheless, they indicate that shifting control of the vehicle and 
therewith liability cannot occur instantly. 
 
8.7 International uniform rules 
An additional factor to be considered is the possibility to have international uniform liability 
rules. Lack of harmonization on AV means that manufacturers have to identify legal risks on a 
per country basis, which creates market fragmentation and high compliance costs.516 Therefore, 
harmonized rules would enhance legal certainty for all parties involved and advance 
technological development.  
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However, this is a problem connected to automotive vehicles in general, which is only 
amplified by the new technology of AV. Thus far, States are not particularly interested in 
establishing uniform liability rules on street traffic. No attempt was made to establish such 
rules in the early days of automotive vehicles, contrary to what happened in aviation517 and 
shipping518. As discussed above, international initiatives have harmonised technical aspects of 
road traffic, but liability, as such, has never been the focal point of discussions. It appears that 
different legal traditions and diverging policy perceptions of States have prevented a common 
understanding. This is exemplified not only by the differences between the liability regimes of 
the European States, but also by the different regimes that can be followed within a single State, 
as the example of the different regimes within the US illustrates.519  
In addition, there is no compelling necessity to introduce international, uniform rules on third-
party liability which are perceived by States as a way of protecting defendants rather than 
assisting the development of the industry. This has been clearly demonstrated in aviation, 
where although the number and value of potential third-party claims in case of an accident are 
much higher than in road traffic, the great majority of States does not favour a uniform third-
party liability regime.520 In most cases, motor vehicles are used for travel within national 
borders, which does not pose any major challenges as to the applicable law. This factor should 
be contrasted with air travel, which despite being used par excellence in international transports 
and crosses routinely large portions of international airspace, it has failed to attract considerable 
interest regarding international uniform third-party liability rules. Besides, product-liability 
regimes remain fragmented at international level. International efforts to harmonize at least the 
rules on the national law applicable to product-liability cases have proved fruitless.521  
Thus, uniform international rules on third-party liability arising from AV do not seem a realistic 
option.  
 
Conclusion 
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AV are a much promising technological development. In the EU such developments have 
different legal parameters from a liability and insurance perspective. 
De lege lata, the strict liability of the manufacturer under the EU Product Liability Directive 
practically channels liability to the manufacturer. It has to be underscored that the full-
harmonization character of the Directive prevents EU member States from laying down special 
product-liability rules on AV. 
At the same time, national legislative initiatives establish special rules on third-party liability 
of the user (keeper or driver), as happened in Germany, or on insurance coverage, as happened 
in England. In both cases, the special rules have been shaped by national traditions, and policy 
perceptions and priorities. In Germany, the legislators wanted to protect the national 
automotive industry, so they amended the rules on third-party liability of the vehicle keeper. 
England has a strong tradition in insurance, so it preferred to adjust the rules on insurance 
coverage. In both cases, legislative initiatives have a temporary character, in order to consider 
technological development. 
Of particular interest is the effect of current international law on road traffic. European States 
that have ratified only the 1949 Geneva Convention and not the 1968 Vienna Convention 
cannot allow driving with hands off the wheel, as the former precludes such possibility.  
Compared with the US, the European landscape on AV is more coherent regarding general 
strict product liability and motor-vehicle insurance. However, the US has a more clear and 
specific policy on AV. In both cases, legislators are opting for extension of current road traffic 
liability and insurance rules to AV, until high-level automation driving systems are developed.  
De lege ferenda there is a need to balance the need for technological development with the 
protection of third parties.  
At present, the risks and benefits from the use of AV are not making a convincing case to depart 
from traditional liability rules on road traffic and defective products. There is no uninsurable 
disaster potential and no radical change in people’s lives to justify limiting the legal right of 
uninvolved victims to receive compensation compared to ordinary vehicles. Until all aspects 
for massive market deployment of AV, including technological developments and business 
models, have matured, so that identification of concrete needs is possible, we see no cause for 
amendments. Legal issues could be tackled through common-sense interpretation of the 
existing rules. 
Although manufacturers ought to be incentivised to introduce new technologies on AV, special 
liability regimes appear unnecessary. AV are advanced with the promise of unprecedented 
safety. It would be self-contradictory and paradoxical to introduce special liability regimes to 
protect manufacturers from increased risks of such new technology. If the technology is not 
safe enough, then its introduction should be postponed until it has achieved the desired safety 
levels. In the meantime, it would be more appropriate to incentivize the industry through 
special measures of a different nature, such as reductions in taxation and in traffic charges.  
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As to international uniform liability rules, their establishment of would be desirable but seems 
to be neither necessary nor politically feasible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
